Day v. MTA New York City Transit Authority

Background

Roy Day, proceeding without a lawyer, applied to become a Train Operator with the MTA New York City Transit Authority. He passed an open competitive civil-service examination and was placed on an eligibility list. The Transit Authority later invited him to begin pre-employment processing.

During a medical evaluation, Day reported that he had undergone a kidney transplant, took anti-rejection medication, and had kidney problems and high blood pressure. He also reported drug-related information, including a history of drug use and participation in a substance-abuse treatment program. Dr. Cecil Akiwumi placed Day on a medical hold while seeking additional information about his kidney function, medications, and drug-use history. Robert Harley, a social worker, required Day to attend a treatment program and obtain current documentation about his recovery.

Day completed the treatment program and provided medical records. Dr. Akiwumi cleared the medical hold on June 27, 2017, and issued a medical qualification slip. When Day brought the slip to the Employment Center, he learned that the Transit Authority was no longer hiring from the open competitive list. Instead, it was hiring from a promotional list that had priority under New York civil-service rules. Day’s open competitive list later expired, and he was never hired as a Train Operator.

Claims and procedural history

Day asserted claims under the Rehabilitation Act of 1983, the New York State Human Rights Law, and the New York City Human Rights Law. In an earlier ruling, the court dismissed his Rehabilitation Act claims against the individual defendants in their personal capacities and his claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The remaining claims were Rehabilitation Act claims against the Transit Authority and New York State and City human-rights claims against the defendants.

The defendants moved for summary judgment, which asks whether the evidence shows that no reasonable jury could rule for the nonmoving party. Day did not submit a statement responding to the defendants’ factual statement or additional evidence with his opposition. The court nevertheless independently reviewed his arguments and the record before treating the defendants’ factual assertions as undisputed where appropriate. The court also stated that it would not consider the defendants’ untimely reply.

Court’s analysis

For the Rehabilitation Act claim, the defendants did not dispute that the Transit Authority received federal funds or, for purposes of the motion, that Day was an individual with a disability. The court therefore focused on whether Day was otherwise qualified for the Train Operator position and whether he was denied the position because of his disability. The court applied generally similar standards to the New York State and New York City claims, while recognizing that the New York City law is interpreted more broadly.

Whether Day was qualified

The court rejected the defendants’ argument that Day could not show he was otherwise qualified because he never reached the criminal-history review stage. The defendants had not shown that a criminal record affected the essential functions of operating a train or that Day’s criminal history would have prevented him from performing those functions. The job examination notice listed medical, drug-screening, language, identity, and work-authorization requirements, but did not list a criminal background check as an essential job requirement.

The court also relied on Day’s passing the examination and receiving medical clearance. It concluded that Day had presented enough evidence to show that he possessed the basic skills necessary for the position and was otherwise qualified for purposes of the disability-discrimination claims.

Whether disability discrimination caused the failed application

The court held that Day had not produced evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that an actual or perceived disability was the cause of the Transit Authority’s failure to hire him. The record did not contain discriminatory comments or other evidence showing that the defendants acted because of Day’s disability. The court found that the evidence instead showed that New York civil-service rules required the Transit Authority to use the certified promotional list before hiring from the open competitive list. By the time Day’s medical hold was cleared, the Transit Authority could no longer hire from his list, which later expired.

The court also found no evidence that the medical hold was imposed or extended because of discriminatory intent. Dr. Akiwumi testified that the additional review was intended to determine whether Day’s medical history and prior drug use affected his ability to operate a subway train safely, not because Dr. Akiwumi viewed him as disabled. The court noted that Harley told Day, after the hold was cleared, that he looked forward to riding on Day’s train, which was inconsistent with an intent to prevent Day from being hired.

The court did not decide whether the approximately 12-week medical hold was an adverse employment action. It concluded that this issue did not need to be resolved because Day had not shown the required connection between discriminatory motives and the failure to hire him. To the extent Day asserted that the Transit Authority failed to provide a reasonable accommodation by not offering an alternative to the treatment-program requirement, the court found that he had not identified a plausible alternative supported by sufficient evidence.

Claims against the individual defendants

The court explained that individuals may be liable under the New York State and New York City human-rights laws for helping another party commit discrimination, but only if an underlying violation occurred. Because Day’s claims against the Transit Authority failed, and because the record also lacked evidence that the individual defendants personally participated in discriminatory conduct, the court granted summary judgment on the claims against them.

Disposition

Judge Vernon S. Broderick granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on all remaining claims and directed the Clerk of Court to terminate the motion and close the case. The court did not add a separate with-prejudice or without-prejudice designation to the ruling.