Tellier v. United States

Background

Robin Scott Tellier was convicted by a jury in 1994 of offenses connected to his leadership of a criminal organization. His convictions included two racketeering counts, five counts under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) for using or carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, six Hobbs Act robbery-conspiracy counts, two counts of possessing a firearm as a convicted felon, and offenses involving interstate transportation of stolen property. He received life sentences on the two racketeering counts. The five firearm sentences were consecutive to one another, while the other sentences ran concurrently with the life sentences.

Tellier filed this motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, a procedure that allows a federal prisoner to challenge a conviction or sentence in the sentencing court. The Second Circuit had authorized him to file a repeat § 2255 motion based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Davis. His original claim concerned the five firearm convictions. After counsel was appointed, the amended filing also challenged the life sentences for the racketeering convictions, asserting that they exceeded the legal maximum and violated the Constitution’s ban on retroactive criminal punishment.

Firearm convictions

The court held that conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery does not qualify as a “crime of violence” under § 924(c) after Davis, following Second Circuit precedent. With the government’s consent, the court vacated Tellier’s five § 924(c) convictions.

Racketeering-sentence challenges

The court did not reach the merits of Tellier’s challenges to his racketeering sentences. First, although the court of appeals had authorized the repeat petition based on the Davis claim, Tellier’s racketeering claims did not satisfy the requirements for a second or successive § 2255 motion. The court explained that authorization to file a petition does not prevent the district court from examining each claim and dismissing claims that do not independently meet the statutory requirements.

Second, the racketeering-sentence claims were procedurally defaulted because Tellier had not raised them on direct appeal. He did not show cause and actual prejudice, and he did not claim factual innocence of the conduct underlying his sentence. The court rejected his argument that being legally innocent of a sentence was enough to invoke the actual-innocence exception.

Third, the court held that the claims were untimely under § 2255’s one-year filing deadline. The actual-innocence exception to that deadline did not apply because Tellier challenged the legal basis for his sentences rather than claiming factual innocence of the conduct supporting them.

Resentencing and amended judgment

The court rejected Tellier’s request for a full resentencing. It explained that a court may have authority to resentence after vacating one conviction when the sentences are genuinely interdependent—for example, when the vacated conviction affected the guidelines calculation or otherwise formed part of an integrated sentencing package. Tellier did not dispute that his § 924(c) convictions had not affected the guidelines range for his other convictions, and he did not explain how they otherwise affected the overall sentence. The court therefore held that it could not resentence him on the remaining convictions, including the two life sentences for racketeering.

Instead, the court ordered an amended judgment without a resentencing hearing. The amended judgment was to remove the § 924(c) convictions and correct incorrect statutory citations listed for Counts 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 12, 18, 19, 20, and 21. The court treated those incorrect citations as clerical errors that could be corrected under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.

Disposition

The § 2255 petition was granted in part and denied in part. The § 924(c) convictions were vacated. The remaining convictions and sentences were unaffected. The court also stated that it would not issue a certificate allowing an appeal concerning the denied portions because Tellier had not made the required substantial showing of a constitutional violation.