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S.D.N.Y.Procedural orderFiled Oct. 25, 2021

Shnyra v. State Street Bank and Trust Co., Inc.

Judge
Gregory Woods
Docket
1:19-cv-02420
Court
U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
Pages
9
Civil ProcedureDiscoveryFee Petition
In one sentence

In Shnyra v. State Street Bank, Judge Woods set a $24,900 discovery-sanctions award against the plaintiffs, payable jointly and severally.

Who this affects

Ksenia Shnyra, Alexander Reyngold, and Kenneth Walker must pay State Street Bank and Trust Co., Inc. $24,900 jointly and severally; the order concerns fees arising from the plaintiffs' discovery violations.

What happened

In Shnyra v. State Street Bank and Trust Co., Inc., the court decided how much State Street Bank and Trust Co., Inc. should receive after the plaintiffs and their counsel were sanctioned for failing to meet discovery obligations. The defendant had requested $37,119.60 in legal fees and expenses.

The court found most of the hours reasonable but excluded 4.5 hours that were outside the earlier sanctions order. It also reduced several hourly rates, including the rates for the partner, senior associate, and paralegal. Those changes produced a total of $24,900.

The court ordered Ksenia Shnyra, Alexander Reyngold, and Kenneth Walker to pay State Street Bank and Trust Co., Inc. $24,900 jointly and severally, meaning each plaintiff could be responsible for the full amount. Judge Gregory H. Woods also asked the parties to discuss a reasonable payment schedule.

The detailed version

For law students, journalists, and other readers who want the full reasoning

Case
Shnyra v. State Street Bank and Trust Co., Inc. · No. 1:19-cv-02420
Judge
Gregory Woods
Date
Oct. 25, 2021

Background

On November 24, 2020, the court sanctioned Ksenia Shnyra, Alexander Reyngold, Kenneth Walker, and their counsel for failing to comply with discovery obligations. The court ordered payment of State Street Bank and Trust Co., Inc.'s reasonable costs and expenses but reserved the question of the amount. State Street submitted a fee application seeking $37,119.60 in legal fees, supported by time records. Ksenia Shnyra, who was then acting without a lawyer, opposed the application and filed a later response.

Legal Standard

The court used a lodestar calculation, which multiplies a reasonable hourly rate by the reasonable number of hours worked. The court reviewed whether the claimed work was connected to the sanctionable conduct, whether the time records were sufficiently detailed, and whether the hourly rates reflected what a reasonable paying client would pay for comparable work in the Southern District of New York.

Analysis

The court found that most of State Street's claimed 66.7 hours were reasonable and that the time records were sufficiently specific. It rejected Shnyra's challenge that the records improperly combined multiple tasks because the entries were concrete enough to permit review.

The court excluded 1.8 hours for preliminary review of discovery responses because that work would have been necessary regardless of the sanctionable conduct. It also excluded 2.7 hours for work performed after briefing on the motion to compel had ended and after the court's sanctions order, because the earlier order did not authorize fees for those later discovery-related activities. The resulting compensable time was 42.6 hours for David Tauster, 15.2 hours for David Rosenthal, 2.9 hours for Michael Caputo, and 1.5 hours for Gail Rosner.

The court found the charged rates excessive for this application in some respects. It reduced Rosenthal's rate from $812 to $450 per hour, Tauster's from $476 to $400 per hour, and Rosner's paralegal rate from $248 to $100 per hour. It left Caputo's $300-per-hour rate unchanged. The court calculated a lodestar of $24,900 and found no reason to reduce or increase that amount further.

Disposition

The court ordered the plaintiffs to pay State Street Bank and Trust Co., Inc. $24,900. The plaintiffs were made jointly and severally responsible for the sanction, so each could be responsible for the entire amount. Although the earlier sanctions order had also placed responsibility on the plaintiffs' former counsel, this order imposed the payment obligation on the plaintiffs. The court noted that this did not prevent the plaintiffs from later seeking recovery of all or part of the amount from former counsel. The parties were asked to meet and discuss a payment schedule, with any disagreement to be presented to the court.

The authoritative version

Read the full 9-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.

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