Erdman v. Victor

Background

Tyler Erdman, proceeding without a lawyer, brought a defamation action against Adam Victor. Victor had served for several decades as president of the board of Manhattan Place Condominium. Erdman worked for Victor for several years until the summer of 2013. In 2014, Erdman assisted his then-girlfriend in bringing a lawsuit against Victor and the condominium. The parties later engaged in litigation in New York and Delaware state courts.

Erdman alleged that, during this litigation, Victor accused him of criminal conduct, including theft of documents and computer hacking, extortion, and trespass. Erdman said Victor made similar accusations to the Department of Justice, the Federal Election Commission, New York Police Department members, and Immigration and Customs Enforcement, as well as in court filings and other communications.

Erdman also based a defamation claim on a May 31, 2019, letter Victor sent to the condominium’s unit owners. The letter referred to Erdman and his former girlfriend as people who falsely claimed to have been condominium employees and described their lawsuits as an “extortionate money grab.” Erdman alleged that the statements were false and ended the possibility of settling his litigation with the condominium.

Ruling on the Motion to Dismiss

Victor moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint states a legally sufficient claim. The court treated the well-pleaded factual allegations as true for purposes of the motion, but did not accept conclusory legal assertions as facts.

Accusations of Criminal Activity

The court held that Erdman sufficiently pleaded defamation based on Victor’s accusations that Erdman committed crimes. The court found that Erdman alleged Victor made false statements to third parties, including law-enforcement and government officials, accusing him of crimes such as theft of computer files, extortion, and conduct affecting national security.

The court treated the accusations as defamation per se, meaning statements that are considered sufficiently harmful to reputation without requiring proof of specific financial loss. Accusing someone of a serious crime qualifies. The court also found that Erdman adequately alleged fault by claiming that Victor acted intentionally, out of spite, and with reckless disregard for whether the accusations were true. Victor did not argue that these statements were protected by a privilege, and the court stated that the allegations would sufficiently plead malice even if he had made that argument. This part of the defamation claim survives.

Statements in the Letter

The court dismissed the defamation claim based on the letter. It explained that the same part of the earlier complaint had already been dismissed and that the Second Amended Complaint did not add facts curing the earlier deficiencies.

The court concluded that describing the lawsuits as an “extortionate money grab” was protected opinion rather than a factual assertion that could support defamation. It also concluded that the letter did not reasonably accuse Erdman of perjury. The complaint’s assertion that the letter accused him of perjury was factually incorrect because the letter did not refer to sworn statements in a proceeding. The court further stated that the letter-related statements did not constitute defamation per se and that the earlier complaint had not alleged special damages, meaning specific financial harm. The court dismissed the letter-related defamation claim.

Motion to Strike

Victor separately asked the court to strike allegations from the complaint under Rule 12(f). The court denied that request. Victor sought to remove allegations concerning his conduct at the condominium and a felony conviction related to political contributions. The court found those allegations relevant to Erdman’s claim that Victor acted with actual malice, meaning knowledge that a statement was false or reckless disregard for the truth. Victor also challenged paragraph 48, but the court noted that the request referred to the original complaint rather than the operative complaint.

Disposition

The court’s conclusion states that Victor’s motion to dismiss was GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The motion to strike was DENIED. The defamation claim based on Victor’s accusations that Erdman committed certain crimes survives, while the defamation claim based on the letter is dismissed. The opinion does not specify whether the letter-related dismissal was with or without prejudice.