Roelcke v. ZiP Aviation, LLC

Background

Katharina Roelcke sued Zip Aviation, LLC, Manhattan Helicopters LLC, and Itai Shoshani. She asserted claims under federal, New York State, and New York City employment laws; breach of contract; quantum meruit, a claim seeking reasonable payment for services; unjust enrichment; and claims arising from alleged physical and sexual assaults. The defendants asserted counterclaims for abuse of process, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and conversion involving a Nissan 350Z.

The defendants moved for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Summary judgment is granted when the evidence shows no genuine dispute about a fact that could affect the result and the moving party is entitled to judgment under the law. Roelcke moved for summary judgment on all of the defendants’ counterclaims.

Defendants’ Motion

The court denied summary judgment on Roelcke’s employment claims under the New York State Human Rights Law, the New York City Human Rights Law, the Fair Labor Standards Act, and the New York Labor Law. The parties disputed whether Roelcke was employed by Zip or Manhattan Helicopters, whether she received compensation or benefits in exchange for her work, how much control the defendants exercised over her work, and whether she worked on a fixed schedule. The record included evidence supporting both sides, including evidence that she received wire transfers, lodging, transportation, and use of a vehicle, as well as evidence that she described herself as a volunteer and that Shoshani financially supported her because of their personal relationship.

The court granted summary judgment to the defendants on Roelcke’s breach-of-contract claims. Although the parties disputed whether they entered an oral employment agreement, the court held that the record did not establish essential terms such as job responsibilities, compensation, benefits, or contract duration. The court also rejected Roelcke’s implied-contract theory because it was not pleaded in the operative complaint and, in any event, the record did not identify the essential terms or show a meeting of the minds. The court separately granted summary judgment dismissing the claim based on the consulting agreement because Roelcke did not address that claim in her opposition brief.

The court denied summary judgment on the quantum-meruit and unjust-enrichment claims. The parties presented conflicting evidence about whether Roelcke reasonably expected payment for her work, including evidence that she understood certain payments to be part of the wages she was owed and evidence that she performed at least some work voluntarily.

The court also denied summary judgment on Roelcke’s assault-related claims, which included intentional infliction of emotional distress, civil claims based on specified New York criminal sexual-offense statutes, and claims under New York City’s Gender Motivated Violence Protection Act. The court held that deciding whether the alleged assaults occurred would require credibility determinations, and the record contained evidence beyond Roelcke’s testimony that could support her allegations. Those credibility disputes could not be resolved on summary judgment.

Roelcke’s Motion on the Counterclaims

The court denied Roelcke’s motion for summary judgment on the defendants’ abuse-of-process counterclaim. It held that the lawsuit and the small-claims action could not support that claim because they did not involve the required type of legal process. However, the orders of protection obtained in New York and Connecticut could qualify as legal process because they required Shoshani to take or refrain from specified actions. The court found factual disputes about whether Roelcke made false allegations, lacked a legitimate justification, sought an improper objective, and caused legally recognized damages. It also rejected Roelcke’s limitations argument.

The court denied summary judgment on the defendants’ intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress counterclaim. The defendants alleged that Roelcke engaged in a deliberate campaign involving false accusations, judicial and administrative proceedings, public statements, and communications with Shoshani’s former wife and former sister-in-law. The court held that disputed evidence could allow a jury to find extreme and outrageous conduct and concluded that the claim was not duplicative of abuse of process because it covered broader conduct.

The court denied summary judgment on the conversion counterclaim concerning the Nissan 350Z. Although Roelcke initially had permission to use the car, the defendants presented evidence that Shoshani later demanded its return and that she did not return it. The court also held that the counterclaim was timely because the parties agreed that the earliest possible accrual date was August 22, 2012, after the relevant limitations cutoff.

Disposition

Judge Koeltl concluded that the defendants’ motion for summary judgment was granted in part and denied in part. Roelcke’s motion for summary judgment was denied. The clerk was directed to close the two motion docket entries identified in the order.