Crowley v. Billboard Magazine

Background

Patrick Crowley sued Billboard Magazine and MRC Media Holdings, LLC, alleging employment discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the New York State Human Rights Law, and the New York City Human Rights Law. He also alleged defamation. In the opinion, MRC stated that Billboard was a trade name for a publication distributed by MRC and was not an entity that could be sued, but the court resolved the claims against Billboard on other grounds.

Crowley worked for Billboard beginning in 2014, led Billboard Pride, and was promoted to Senior Director of Billboard Pride in February 2019. In October 2018, he exchanged sexually charged Instagram messages with NEO 10Y, an artist he covered and over whom he had editorial discretion. After the messages became the subject of a forthcoming BuzzFeed article, MRC investigated. MRC representatives reviewed the messages and met with Crowley. Crowley was fired on March 14, 2019, because the defendants said his conduct did not meet Billboard’s ethical and professional standards.

The defendants later made statements to BuzzFeed and published statements on Billboard’s website and in a letter from the editor. The statements described Crowley’s conduct as unprofessional, inappropriate, or contrary to professional and ethical standards, and stated that Billboard had never blacklisted anyone.

Employment-discrimination claims

The court applied the burden-shifting framework used for Title VII and New York State Human Rights Law discrimination claims. Under that framework, a plaintiff must first present evidence supporting an initial inference of discrimination. The employer may then offer a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged action, after which the plaintiff must present evidence that the stated reason was false and that discrimination was the real reason. The court also applied the separate mixed-motive analysis required for the New York City Human Rights Law claim.

The court held that Crowley did not establish an initial case of discrimination or show that discrimination motivated his termination. The court emphasized that Deanna Brown, who participated in both Crowley’s promotion and termination decisions, was gay; that two people who assumed Crowley’s responsibilities were also members of the same protected class; and that Crowley identified no similarly situated heterosexual employee who had engaged in comparable conduct.

Crowley relied on the treatment of two heterosexual male employees, Julian Holguin and Jared Stone. The court found they were not similarly situated because their alleged conduct involved inappropriate comments toward coworkers, while Crowley sent lewd messages to an artist he covered, had editorial discretion over the artist, and generated negative publicity for Billboard.

Crowley also relied on an alleged comment by Brown in fall 2018 that gay men are more likely to be fans of female artists. The court treated the comment as a stray remark that was too remote from, and unrelated to, the termination decision to support an inference of discrimination. The court likewise rejected Crowley’s argument that the termination investigation was procedurally defective, finding no evidence that the relevant policies required a particular investigation or that the defendants violated those policies.

The court further held that the defendants had legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the termination. Crowley admitted sending sexually charged messages to an artist he covered, and the record showed that the conduct violated professional and ethical industry standards. The court found that Crowley did not provide sufficient evidence that these reasons were pretextual, meaning false reasons used to conceal discrimination. It therefore granted MRC’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the Title VII, New York State Human Rights Law, and New York City Human Rights Law claims.

The court also stated that Crowley’s attempt to argue gender discrimination in his opposition brief did not add a gender-discrimination claim because he had not pleaded one in his complaint.

Defamation claims

Under New York law, the court explained, a defamation claim requires a false written statement about the plaintiff, publication to a third party, fault, and either special damages or a statement actionable without proof of specific financial loss. Statements that are opinions rather than assertions of fact, and statements that are substantially true, generally cannot support defamation liability.

The court rejected Crowley’s challenge to the defendants’ statement to BuzzFeed. Read in the context of the BuzzFeed article, the statement that Billboard had never blacklisted anyone meant that Crowley had not blacklisted NEO 10Y while working for Billboard. The parties agreed that Billboard had never blacklisted anyone. The court therefore found that portion of the statement true. It also found that the statement describing Crowley’s behavior as unprofessional was an opinion, and that the statement about the conduct not reflecting company standards was true.

The court rejected the claim based on Billboard’s March 21 statement because describing the conduct as “deplorable” was an opinion and because the statement that the conduct violated Billboard’s professional and ethical standards was true. It rejected the claim based on the letter from the editor because Crowley identified no false part of the statement and because describing his messages as inappropriate was a non-actionable opinion.

The court also granted summary judgment on defamation claims based on a March 19 statement to Gay Star News and a March 26 statement posted on Billboard’s website because Crowley did not address those claims in his opposition to the motion.

Claims against Billboard and final disposition

MRC moved for summary judgment on its own behalf. Billboard had not been served according to the record, and no lawyer had appeared for it. The court nevertheless determined that Crowley had a full and fair opportunity to oppose summary judgment because he asserted identical claims against MRC and Billboard and treated the motion as applying to both defendants.

The court therefore granted, on its own initiative, summary judgment dismissing all claims against Billboard for the same reasons it rejected the claims against MRC. Judge John G. Koeltl concluded that MRC’s motion for summary judgment was granted and that summary judgment dismissing all of Crowley’s claims against Billboard was also granted. The clerk was directed to enter judgment dismissing the case, close the case, and close all pending motions.