Moraes v. White

Background

Barbara Moraes alleged that the Whites hired her as a nanny in August 2019 and terminated her employment in July 2020 after she told April White about psychological difficulties following a violent attack. Moraes alleged that, after her termination, the Whites warned her to stay away from their son and from parts of Manhattan, threatened to involve law enforcement, and sent people to her apartment with letters from the Whites’ lawyer.

Moraes later obtained work with the Cohen-Glassberg family. She alleged that April White posted accusations in two Facebook groups, including that Moraes had engaged in conduct amounting to stalking and harassment and posed a safety concern. Moraes also alleged that the Whites or their representatives made false statements about her to others, including statements that caused the Cohen-Glassbergs to end her employment. She claimed that the Whites’ conduct caused continuing anxiety and fear, insomnia, disordered eating, and other emotional harm.

Moraes asserted three defamation claims, a claim described as tortious interference with contract, a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, and three New York Labor Law claims. The Whites moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which allows dismissal when a complaint does not plead enough facts to support a legally plausible claim. Their motion challenged the defamation, job-interference, and emotional-distress claims but not the New York Labor Law claims.

Materials Considered on the Motion

The court considered the complaint, documents attached to it, and certain documents incorporated into or integral to the complaint. It found the August 15, 2020 letter from Moraes and the transcript of the August 20, 2020 call fully cognizable, and considered part of a text-message exchange. It did not consider the Whites’ criminal complaint or a separate text-message exchange because the complaint did not sufficiently rely on or describe those materials.

Defamation Claims

Under New York law, a defamation claim generally requires a false statement about the plaintiff, communication of that statement to another person, fault, and either actual damages or a statement actionable without proof of specific financial loss. The court held that the two Facebook posts could reasonably be understood as conveying provable facts, not merely protected opinions. Although the posts used opinion-like language, the court found that their context could imply that White knew undisclosed facts showing Moraes had stalked and harassed the Whites’ child and deserved criminal prosecution.

The court treated the alleged accusations as false at this stage because the complaint denied that Moraes had stalked or harassed the child or engaged in the conduct described in the posts. It also held that Moraes sufficiently alleged the required level of fault, even assuming the more demanding standard applied to statements concerning a matter of community concern. The court rejected the Whites’ argument that the posts were protected by a common-interest privilege because the posts were unsolicited, sought information for White’s benefit, and appeared in large Facebook groups rather than a narrowly defined group of people with a shared immediate interest.

As to the January 12, 2021 letter taped to Moraes’s apartment door, the court treated Moraes’s claim based on the alleged post-August encounter with the Whites’ child as abandoned after her lawyer acknowledged that an encounter appeared to have occurred. The court nevertheless held that Moraes adequately alleged falsity concerning the letter’s statement that a former employer had fired her for “problematic and disruptive behavior.” It also held that she adequately alleged fault and that the pre-litigation privilege did not require dismissal because the complaint alleged that the letter was part of a campaign to harass and pressure her rather than a good-faith effort connected to anticipated litigation.

Interference with Employment

The court construed Moraes’s tortious-interference-with-contract claim as a claim for tortious interference with business relations because her employment with the Cohen-Glassbergs was allegedly terminable at will. That type of claim required her to allege a business relationship, interference, wrongful or improper conduct, and injury to the relationship.

The court held that Moraes plausibly alleged each element. She alleged that she was employed by the Cohen-Glassbergs, that White posted about her in a group connected to her employer and separately spoke with the employer, and that White made false accusations to obtain Moraes’s termination. The complaint also alleged that the employer ended Moraes’s employment because of the situation involving the Whites. The court concluded that the alleged defamatory statements could constitute the wrongful means necessary for this claim.

Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

To state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress under New York law, a plaintiff must allege extreme and outrageous conduct, an intent or reckless disregard for causing severe emotional distress, a causal connection, and severe emotional distress. The court held that Moraes plausibly alleged a deliberate, multi-step campaign of harassment, including threats involving law enforcement, communications at her apartment, public accusations in Facebook groups, and letters containing allegedly false statements that were visible to other building residents.

The court also held that Moraes adequately alleged harm by claiming persistent anxiety and fear requiring medication, insomnia, and disordered eating. It rejected the argument that the complaint had to separately allocate those symptoms between her earlier trauma and the Whites’ alleged conduct at the motion-to-dismiss stage.

Disposition

The court denied the Whites’ motion to dismiss in its entirety and directed the Clerk to terminate the motion at Docket 15. The opinion states that the case remained in discovery, with fact discovery scheduled to end on February 11, 2022. The ruling did not decide whether Moraes would ultimately prove her claims; it held that the challenged claims could proceed beyond the pleading stage.