Suarez v. Sullivan

Background

Elvin Suarez sued officials and agencies connected with the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision and the New York State Office of Mental Health under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He alleged that officials failed to provide needed mental-health treatment after he arrived at Downstate Correctional Facility, failed to respond appropriately when he refused psychiatric medication, and placed or kept him in segregated confinement despite knowing about his serious mental illness and risk of deterioration.

Suarez alleged that he had schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type, had been prescribed Zyprexa, and received an S-designation indicating a need for intensive mental-health services. He alleged that he went through periods without mental-health treatment, was not formally evaluated after refusing medication, and was placed in segregated confinement without the required diversion assessments or heightened therapeutic care. He further alleged that he was released from segregated confinement and prison without treatment or medication and that, the next day, he stabbed his mother while experiencing active psychosis.

Suarez also asserted claims under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act against Anthony J. Annucci, Ann Marie T. Sullivan, the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision, and the Office of Mental Health. He brought a claim under New York Correction Law § 137(6), known as the Special Housing Unit Exclusion Law, against the Office of Mental Health, Ryan Lahey, and Samantha L. Kulick. He also asserted negligent supervision and training claims against Sullivan and the Office of Mental Health.

Legal standard

The defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which asks whether the complaint states a legally sufficient claim. At this stage, the court accepted well-pleaded factual allegations as true and considered whether they plausibly supported relief. The court did not decide whether the allegations would ultimately be proven.

Eighth Amendment medical-treatment claims

The court held that Suarez plausibly alleged that he was denied adequate medical care and that his psychiatric condition was serious. The alleged gaps in treatment, lack of response to medication refusal, failure to provide medication counseling, and lack of mental-health treatment during periods of segregated confinement were sufficient at the pleading stage. The court also found that Suarez plausibly alleged the required mental state—deliberate indifference, meaning awareness of a substantial risk of serious harm and failure to respond reasonably—for Annucci, Robert Morton, Lahey, Abadul Qayyum, Peter M. Horan, Kulick, Brandon N. Reynolds, and Chesney J. Baker.

The court reached a different conclusion for Sullivan and Maura L. DiNardo. The complaint did not plausibly allege that Sullivan personally knew about Suarez, his mental illness, or his confinement in segregated housing. As to DiNardo, the complaint alleged only that she presented mental-health testimony at Suarez’s disciplinary hearing and did not allege facts showing deliberate indifference. The court therefore dismissed the Eighth Amendment medical-treatment claims against Sullivan and DiNardo, while allowing them to proceed against the other individual defendants.

Eighth Amendment conditions-of-confinement claims

The court also held that Suarez plausibly alleged that his confinement in segregated housing, combined with the lack of medication and mental-health care, posed an unreasonable risk of serious harm to his health. It found that he plausibly alleged the necessary deliberate-indifference mental state against Annucci, Morton, Lahey, Qayyum, Horan, Kulick, Reynolds, and Baker. The court dismissed the conditions-of-confinement claims against Sullivan and DiNardo for the same lack of allegations showing their required knowledge and disregard of a serious risk.

Qualified immunity

The individual defendants argued that qualified immunity protected them from the Eighth Amendment claims. Qualified immunity can protect government officials from personal liability when their conduct did not violate a clearly established constitutional right. The court denied that defense at the motion-to-dismiss stage because Suarez plausibly alleged violations of clearly established rights and the complaint did not show that the remaining defendants’ conduct was objectively reasonable. The court stated that the defendants could raise the defense later, if appropriate, on a motion for summary judgment.

Americans with Disabilities Act and Rehabilitation Act claims

The court dismissed Suarez’s claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act. Suarez alleged that placing him in segregated housing was disparate treatment because of his mental illness, but he did not allege that disabled inmates were treated differently from nondisabled disruptive inmates. His alternative theory—that failing to divert him to a therapeutic placement was a failure to accommodate—challenged the quality of his mental-health treatment rather than alleging the type of disability-based denial of services covered by those statutes. The court also found that his allegations of discrimination were conclusory.

Special Housing Unit Exclusion Law claim

The court held that New York Correction Law § 137(6) includes an implied private right of action. It concluded that Suarez belonged to the class the statute was intended to benefit, that a private lawsuit would promote the law’s purpose, and that such a lawsuit was not shown to be inconsistent with the statutory scheme. However, the court held that the claim could be brought only against Lahey and Kulick, not against the Office of Mental Health, because the agency had sovereign immunity.

The court also found the claim timely. Suarez was released from segregated confinement on September 5, 2017, and filed this action on September 1, 2020, within the three-year limitations period the court applied. The court held that Suarez plausibly alleged that Lahey and Kulick failed to advocate for diversion from segregated housing, conduct periodic mental-health evaluations, and provide the heightened care required by the law. The § 137(6) claim could therefore proceed against Lahey and Kulick but was dismissed against the Office of Mental Health.

Negligent supervision and training

The court dismissed the negligent supervision and training claim against Sullivan and the Office of Mental Health because Suarez did not address the defendants’ dismissal argument in his opposition brief. The court treated the claim as abandoned.

Disposition

Judge Briccetti granted in part and denied in part the motion to dismiss. The court dismissed the Eighth Amendment claims against Sullivan and DiNardo; the Americans with Disabilities Act and Rehabilitation Act claims; the § 137(6) claim against the Office of Mental Health; and the negligent supervision and training claim. The remaining Eighth Amendment claims against Annucci, Morton, Lahey, Qayyum, Horan, Kulick, Reynolds, and Baker, and the § 137(6) claim against Lahey and Kulick, were allowed to proceed. The clerk was instructed to terminate Sullivan, DiNardo, the Office of Mental Health, and the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision from the docket, and the remaining defendants were ordered to answer.