Marquez v. Silver

Background

Alexis Marquez, who the opinion identifies as formerly having been a law clerk with the New York Supreme Court, brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the New York State Human Rights Law, and the New York City Human Rights Law. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint. On April 2, 2021, the court granted that motion in part and denied it in part.

Marquez then moved under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 59(e) and 60(b) to obtain relief from the earlier judgment. She also sought permission to amend her complaint again. The opinion states that she had already amended her complaint twice before the defendants filed their dismissal motion and argued that refusing another amendment was clear error.

Court’s analysis

The court explained that changing or overturning a judgment under Rule 59(e) is an extraordinary remedy generally limited to an intervening change in controlling law, new evidence, clear error, or the need to prevent serious injustice. Rule 60(b)(1) permits relief for mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect, including certain legal or factual mistakes. The court emphasized that reconsideration is not an opportunity to present new theories or take a second opportunity to litigate issues already decided.

The court rejected Marquez’s argument that the earlier decision was wrong merely because she disagreed with it. It also concluded that her proposed amendments either repeated matters already considered or added conclusory allegations that did not cure the deficiencies in her claims.

On the Title VII claims, Marquez proposed adding the State of New York as a defendant. The court maintained its prior conclusion that she had not adequately alleged that the State exercised the direct, obvious, and concrete control over her daily work needed to qualify as her employer under Title VII.

Regarding Janet DiFiore and Kay-Ann Porter, the court maintained that Marquez had not plausibly alleged that they were her supervisors for purposes of Title VII or that they were personally involved for purposes of § 1983. As to Porter specifically, the court found that the proposed allegations did not plausibly show that Porter was Marquez’s supervisor or was involved in the decision to terminate or refuse to hire her. The court also stated that claims against other defendants could proceed, but it declined to revisit the dismissal of the § 1983 claims against Porter.

The court further rejected proposed amendments concerning several alleged adverse employment actions, including allegations about hiring practices, job postings, withheld information about positions, and a claimed demotion involving a transfer from a principal court-attorney position to the Brooklyn Law Department. It said these allegations had already been presented and that another amendment would give Marquez a second opportunity to litigate them. The court also declined to reconsider its rejection of proposed amendments concerning the hostile-work-environment and due-process claims, finding the proposed allegations conclusory, repetitive, and insufficient to make those claims plausible.

Disposition

Judge Andrew L. Carter, Jr. denied Marquez’s motion for reconsideration under Rules 59(e) and 60(b). The court also declined to grant her leave to amend the complaint. The opinion does not state that the ruling was issued with or without prejudice.