Washington v. United States

Background

Randy Washington, representing himself, filed a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, a procedure allowing a federal prisoner to challenge a conviction or sentence on specified constitutional or legal grounds. His petition arose from convictions for conspiracy to commit robbery, robbery and attempted robbery, brandishing a firearm during a robbery, conspiracy to distribute narcotics, and trafficking firearms. The jury found him guilty on all counts in March 2012. The court later imposed a total 27-year prison sentence. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the conviction.

Washington raised several arguments, including alleged government violations involving favorable evidence, incompetence during plea negotiations, ineffective assistance of counsel, improper admission of evidence from prior state arrests, the claim that Hobbs Act robbery was not a qualifying “crime of violence” for a firearm charge, ineffective assistance in an earlier state case, an improper sentencing enhancement, an unlawful search, a defective indictment and jury instructions, and failure to prove the elements of the firearm offenses.

Court’s analysis

The court explained that a § 2255 petition generally cannot be used to relitigate issues already decided on direct appeal or to raise new issues that could have been presented on appeal. A claim not raised on appeal could proceed only if Washington showed a legally sufficient reason for the omission and actual harm, or showed that he was actually innocent.

The court held that Washington’s claims concerning the government’s failure to call Wilston Regis and the disclosure of information about Kirk Bent were procedurally barred. Washington had not shown a sufficient reason for failing to raise those issues on direct appeal, actual harm, or actual innocence. The court likewise held that his competency and plea-related ineffective-assistance claims were barred because they had already been considered by the district court and the Second Circuit.

The court also held that Washington’s challenge to the admission of evidence from prior state arrests was procedurally barred and, alternatively, lacked merit. It stated that the evidence was admitted as direct evidence of the charged drug and firearm conspiracies and for permissible purposes under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)(2), rather than merely to show a propensity for crime.

On the firearm conviction based on Hobbs Act robbery, the court ruled that Second Circuit precedent establishes that Hobbs Act robbery qualifies as a “crime of violence” under the elements clause of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). The court distinguished decisions invalidating a separate residual clause as unconstitutionally vague. It therefore rejected Washington’s argument regarding Count Six.

The court rejected Washington’s challenge to the prior felony information that increased the mandatory minimum sentence for the narcotics conspiracy. It held that 21 U.S.C. § 851(e) barred a challenge to the earlier conviction because that conviction occurred more than five years before the prior felony information was filed. The court also held that Washington’s related argument—that a jury, rather than the judge, had to determine the prior conviction—lacked merit. Under § 851, the court, not a jury, determines issues concerning a prior conviction used for the sentencing enhancement. This claim was also procedurally barred because Washington had not raised it on direct appeal.

The court held that Washington’s Fourth Amendment challenge to the warrantless search was procedurally barred because the Second Circuit had already rejected it on direct appeal. It rejected the indictment and jury-instruction challenge because Count Six identified the robbery in Count Three as the predicate crime of violence, and the jury instructions were consistent with the indictment. Finally, the court rejected Washington’s reliance on Rehaif v. United States, explaining that Rehaif’s knowledge requirement applies to specified firearm-possession charges under 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g) and 924(a)(2), not to the offenses for which Washington was convicted.

Compassionate release and disposition

The court treated a later letter from Washington as a motion for compassionate release under the First Step Act. It held that Washington had not submitted an administrative request to the Bureau of Prisons and therefore had not exhausted the required administrative process. Because the United States opposed the motion on that basis, the court denied the compassionate-release motion without prejudice to renewal after exhaustion.

Judge Richard J. Sullivan denied Washington’s § 2255 petition in its entirety and denied his separate compassionate-release motion. The court declined to issue a certificate of appealability and certified that any appeal would not be taken in good faith, so Washington could not proceed on appeal without paying the required filing fee.