Harrell v. Miller

Background

Lonnie Harrell sought federal review under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 of his New York state-court conviction. The opinion states that a jury convicted him of two counts of first-degree criminal sexual act, two counts of first-degree sexual abuse, two counts of third-degree criminal sexual act, and one count of attempted first-degree rape. The sentence totaled 25 years of incarceration followed by 15 years of post-release supervision, and the opinion states that Harrell remained in custody under that sentence.

Harrell raised two grounds for relief: ineffective assistance of trial counsel and denial of his due-process right to be present during discussions about how to respond to a jury note requesting a readback of the complainant’s testimony. During the relevant events, Harrell was initially in the holding pens. He came to the courtroom after saying he wanted to do so, was brought up to date, conferred with counsel, and was present when the requested testimony and jury instructions were read back.

Legal standard

The court applied the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, which sharply limits federal habeas relief when a state court has already decided a federal claim on the merits. Relief is available only when the state court’s decision was contrary to, or unreasonably applied, clearly established federal law as determined by the United States Supreme Court.

For ineffective assistance of counsel, the court applied the two-part test from Strickland v. Washington: the petitioner must show that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that the deficient performance caused prejudice, meaning a reasonable probability that the result would have been different.

For the presence claim, the court asked whether Harrell’s presence during the disputed proceeding would have contributed to his opportunity to defend himself. The right to be present does not extend to every proceeding when the defendant’s presence would be useless or provide only a minimal benefit.

Ineffective assistance of counsel

The New York trial court had rejected Harrell’s ineffective-assistance claim both because it was procedurally barred and because it failed on the merits. The federal court held that the independent state procedural ruling was enough to bar federal review. It also addressed the merits in the alternative.

The court found no unreasonable application of Strickland. It concluded that counsel was not ineffective for failing to seek suppression of cell-site location information because Harrell’s trial occurred before the Supreme Court’s decision in Carpenter v. United States, and the relevant legal protection was not clearly established at the time. The court reasoned that counsel generally cannot be faulted for failing to anticipate a later legal development.

The court also rejected Harrell’s challenge to counsel’s handling of Y-STR DNA evidence. Counsel had consulted a DNA expert, introduced statistical evidence challenging the strength of the DNA profile, and cross-examined the prosecution’s expert about the fact that paternal relatives could share the profile and that thousands of males could have been the source of the DNA. The court found that choosing this strategy instead of seeking to exclude the evidence was not unreasonable.

The court rejected Harrell’s claims concerning the prosecutor’s closing argument and counsel’s failure to object. It found that the prosecutor’s argument fairly represented the evidence and was a proper response to the defense argument, and that counsel’s decision not to object was reasonable as a matter of trial strategy.

Finally, the court found that counsel was not ineffective at sentencing. Counsel made brief remarks but asked the court to impose the minimum sentence. The court also concluded that the information about mental illness in the presentence report did not show that medical evaluations existed or that counsel had been told of a history that would have affected the sentence.

Right to be present

The court rejected Harrell’s claim that he had a federal constitutional right to participate in the discussions between counsel and the court about selecting the testimony to be read back. The court noted that Harrell was informed about what had been discussed, had an opportunity to discuss the relevant issues with counsel, and was present for the actual readback.

The court held that the New York Appellate Division’s decision—that Harrell had a right to be present for the readback but not for the preceding discussions—was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.

Disposition

The court denied the petition to vacate the judgment and sentence. Judge Hellerstein directed the Clerk to terminate the motion and enter judgment dismissing the case.