Harrell v. Miller

Background

Lonnie Harrell sought federal review under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 of his New York conviction. Following a jury trial, he had been convicted of multiple counts of criminal sexual act, sexual abuse, and attempted rape. The opinion states that he was sentenced to concurrent maximum terms totaling 25 years of incarceration, followed by 15 years of post-release supervision.

Harrell raised two grounds for relief: ineffective assistance of trial counsel and violation of his due-process right to be present during discussions about how to respond to a jury note requesting a readback of testimony. During the relevant trial proceedings, Harrell was initially in the holding pens while counsel and the prosecutor identified testimony responsive to the jury’s request. Harrell then came to the courtroom, consulted with counsel, and was present when the requested testimony and jury instructions were read back.

Ineffective-assistance claim

The court first addressed Harrell’s claim that his trial lawyer was ineffective. The state trial court had rejected that claim on both a state procedural ground and its merits. The federal court held that the state procedural ruling independently barred federal review. The court nevertheless considered the claim on the merits and concluded that relief would also be unwarranted under the federal standard established by Strickland v. Washington.

The court rejected Harrell’s arguments concerning several decisions by trial counsel. It found that counsel’s failure to seek suppression of cell-site location information was not unreasonable because the trial occurred before the Supreme Court’s decision in Carpenter v. United States. It also found that counsel reasonably handled the Y-STR DNA evidence by consulting a DNA expert, presenting evidence about the limitations of that evidence, and cross-examining the prosecution’s expert.

The court further concluded that counsel’s decisions concerning the prosecutor’s closing argument were strategic and that the prosecutor’s argument was proper. It rejected Harrell’s claim concerning sentencing, finding that counsel’s brief request for the minimum sentence was reasonable in light of the offense history and trial evidence. The court also found no indication that additional evidence concerning Harrell’s reported mental-health history would likely have changed the sentence. It therefore denied the ineffective-assistance claim.

Right to be present

The court next considered Harrell’s claim that he had a constitutional right to participate in discussions between counsel and the court about the jury’s request. The court explained that a defendant must be present when the defendant’s absence could undermine the fairness of the proceedings, but not when being present would provide no meaningful benefit.

The Appellate Division had concluded that Harrell had a right to be present for the testimony readback but not for the preceding discussions about identifying the relevant portions of the record. The federal court held that this decision was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court law. It also relied on the record showing that Harrell was told what had been discussed, had an opportunity to discuss the issues with counsel, and was present for the readback itself. The court denied this claim.

Disposition

Judge Hellerstein concluded that no state-court decision involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law or an unreasonable determination of the facts. The court denied Harrell’s petition to vacate the judgment and sentence. It also denied a certificate of appealability because Harrell had not made a substantial showing that a constitutional right had been denied. The Clerk was directed to terminate the petition and enter judgment dismissing the case.