Sweigert v. Goodman

Background

George Sweigert sued Jason Goodman for defamation and for violating Sections 50 and 51 of the New York Civil Rights Law, which protect certain privacy and publicity rights. The case involved statements Goodman allegedly made about Sweigert and Goodman’s sale of a coffee mug bearing Sweigert’s image. The opinion states that both parties were representing themselves and had repeatedly accused each other of criminal conduct and other misconduct on the internet.

Goodman moved for partial summary judgment, a procedure for deciding claims without a trial when there is no genuine dispute about an important fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment under the law. His motion addressed twelve allegedly defamatory statements, the coffee-mug privacy claim, his purported counterclaim under New York’s anti-SLAPP statute, and additional relief. “Anti-SLAPP” refers to protections against lawsuits intended to chill valid speech or public participation.

Sweigert moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d) for additional discovery concerning actual malice, an element relevant to some defamation claims. He also moved for sanctions under Rule 56(h) and to strike allegedly scandalous material from Goodman’s amended motion notice under Rule 12(f). Magistrate Judge Aaron issued a report and recommendation addressing these motions. Sweigert objected to the recommendation; Goodman did not object or respond. Judge Caproni reviewed the objected-to portions under the required standard and reviewed the remaining portions for clear error.

Goodman’s Defamation Motion

New York defamation claims generally require proof of a defamatory statement about the plaintiff, publication to a third party, fault, falsity, and either special damages or a statement actionable without proof of special damages. The court adopted the recommendation to grant Goodman’s motion as to ten of the twelve statements and deny it as to statements four and five.

The court granted summary judgment as to statements one and three. Those statements referred to Goodman’s communications with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and his efforts to seek criminal prosecution. The court said the alleged defamatory meaning was the implication that Sweigert had committed a crime, not merely that Goodman had contacted the FBI. Even so, the statements were not defamatory per se, meaning they did not automatically support a defamation claim without proof of special damages, and Sweigert had not shown special damages.

The court granted summary judgment as to statement two, which included Goodman’s statements that Sweigert “should be in jail” and that Goodman intended to have people prosecuted criminally. The first statement was a nonactionable opinion because “should” expressed an opinion that could not be proven true or false. The second was also treated as an opinion in context and did not identify a serious crime. The court additionally found that Sweigert had not shown special damages.

The court denied summary judgment as to statements four and five. It adopted the recommendation that those claims should not be dismissed at this stage. The opinion states that the remaining factual and legal issues included whether the statements were actionable and whether Goodman acted with actual malice under the applicable standard.

The court granted summary judgment as to statements six and nine. It also granted summary judgment as to statements seven and ten, which accused Sweigert of participating in an organized harassment campaign. The court found that Sweigert had not shown special damages and that the accusations did not constitute defamation per se because harassment was not a serious crime for this purpose. The court also rejected Sweigert’s argument that the statements were defamatory per se because they harmed his professional reputation as a certified ethical hacker, finding no sufficient connection between the statements and that profession.

The court granted summary judgment as to statement eight, in which Goodman said that Sweigert had “interfered with an officer of the court.” The court found that the statement was not reasonably understood as accusing Sweigert of a serious crime. It also stated that even if the statement were understood as accusing him of violating Arizona law, the alleged offense was a misdemeanor rather than a serious crime.

The court granted summary judgment as to statements eleven and twelve, which called Sweigert a “dead beat dad” and accused him of abandoning his son. The court found that the statements could be defamatory but were not defamatory per se and that Sweigert had no evidence of special damages. The court concluded that the phrase “deadbeat dad” did not reasonably convey serious criminal conduct.

Privacy Claim

Goodman sought summary judgment on Sweigert’s claim that selling the coffee mug with Sweigert’s image violated Sections 50 and 51 of the New York Civil Rights Law. The court denied Goodman’s motion as to that claim because factual issues remained about whether Goodman’s use of the image was protected expression.

Goodman’s Counterclaim and Additional Relief

The court denied Goodman’s motion for summary judgment on his purported anti-SLAPP counterclaim. Judge Aaron had previously permitted Goodman to amend his answer to assert an anti-SLAPP defense, but Goodman instead filed what he called a counterclaim seeking costs and damages. The court adopted the recommendation that New York’s special anti-SLAPP summary-judgment procedures conflict with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 and do not apply in federal court. The court also found that Goodman had not shown entitlement to costs or attorney’s fees under the statute.

The court also denied Goodman’s request for a declaration that Sweigert was a vexatious litigant and an injunction requiring Sweigert to obtain permission before filing another self-represented action in the court. The court found that Goodman had not established a legal or factual basis for that relief.

Sweigert’s Motions

The court granted Sweigert’s Rule 56(d) motion for additional discovery as to statements four and five. It denied the motion as to the other statements addressed by Goodman’s summary-judgment motion because Sweigert had not provided evidence of other required elements of those defamation claims.

The court denied Sweigert’s Rule 56(h) motion for sanctions. It found that his conclusory accusations that Goodman’s declaration and factual statement contained misrepresentations did not satisfy the strict sanctions standard.

The court also denied Sweigert’s Rule 12(f) motion to strike allegedly scandalous material from Goodman’s amended notice of motion. Rule 12(f) permits courts to strike material from pleadings, and the court held that a motion notice is not a pleading covered by that rule.

Order to Show Cause and Disposition

The court stated that both parties had ignored earlier warnings against excessive, amended, piecemeal, and frivolous filings. It ordered both parties to show cause in writing to Judge Aaron by February 4, 2022, explaining why the court should not require them to obtain permission before making future filings that had not been ordered by the court. The proposed restriction would require a motion for permission and a sworn statement that the filing was not duplicative, frivolous, made in bad faith, or inconsistent with court rules. The court did not impose that restriction in this opinion; it required the parties to explain why it should not be imposed.

Judge Caproni adopted Judge Aaron’s report and recommendation in full. The court’s final dispositions were: Goodman’s motion for partial summary judgment was granted in part and denied in part; Sweigert’s additional-discovery motion was granted as to statements four and five and denied as to the remaining statements addressed by Goodman’s motion; and Sweigert’s sanctions and motion-to-strike motions were denied.