Waters v. United States

Background

Andrea Waters was riding a rented bicycle on Madison Avenue in Manhattan on February 19, 2020, near a vehicle-security checkpoint maintained by the U.S. Secret Service. A military working dog named Rosso, handled by Staff Sergeant Ian McKinney of the U.S. Air Force, bit Waters as she passed the checkpoint. She was taken to a hospital, diagnosed with superficial abrasions, and released.

The opinion states that Rosso had shown anxious behavior after arriving in New York and had bitten another person at the same checkpoint on January 28, 2020. McKinney reported that earlier bite, but the Government continued deploying Rosso at the checkpoint. The Waterses sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act, alleging negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and loss of consortium. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, which asks whether the evidence requires judgment for one side without a trial.

Federal Tort Claims Act and New York law

The Federal Tort Claims Act waives the United States’ sovereign immunity for certain claims seeking money damages for injury caused by a Government employee’s negligent or wrongful act within the scope of employment. The plaintiff must identify a comparable claim—a “private analogue”—that could be brought against a private person under the law of the place where the injury occurred. The court applied New York law because the injury occurred in New York City.

The court explained that New York generally imposes strict liability on an animal owner who knew or should have known of the animal’s vicious or violent propensities. Strict liability does not require proof that the owner acted negligently. The Federal Tort Claims Act, however, excludes claims based on strict or absolute liability.

The Waterses argued that McKinney negligently handled Rosso and that the Government negligently failed to warn about or correct Rosso’s dangerous behavior. They also argued that New York’s animal-liability rule should not apply to a military working dog and urged the court to extend a New York exception involving farm animals. The court rejected those arguments, reasoning that the Waterses identified no New York authority recognizing a negligence claim for injuries caused by a military dog in these circumstances. It also concluded that New York courts had refused to permit negligence or premises-liability theories to replace the strict-liability rule when the injury was caused by a domestic animal’s aggressive behavior.

The court noted that New York has recognized a separate negligence claim against a veterinary clinic in a particular circumstance, but found that exception inapplicable here. The court stated that, regardless of how negligent the Government might have been, the Federal Tort Claims Act did not waive immunity for the claims presented under the applicable New York law.

Other claims and disposition

The court dismissed the Federal Tort Claims Act claim for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. It also dismissed the intentional- and negligent-infliction-of-emotional-distress claims because they arose from conduct covered by the traditional animal-injury remedy and, in any event, could not proceed when the underlying claim was unavailable under the Federal Tort Claims Act.

Geoffrey Waters’s loss-of-consortium claim failed because New York treats that claim as derivative of the injured spouse’s claim, and the court lacked jurisdiction over Andrea Waters’s Federal Tort Claims Act claim. The court also dismissed the requested injunctive relief with prejudice because the Federal Tort Claims Act authorizes money damages but not an injunction. A claim under New York Agriculture and Markets Law § 123 and claims based on negligent training and supervision had previously been dismissed with prejudice by stipulation.

Order

Judge Valerie Caproni denied the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, granted the Government’s motion for summary judgment, and dismissed the case. The Clerk was directed to terminate the open motions and close the case.