L B v. New York City Department of Education

Background

L.B., a fourteen-year-old child with Autism Spectrum Disorder and Specific Learning Disabilities, receives special-education services from the New York City Department of Education. He attended the nonpublic Learning Spring school from fourth through eighth grade, but Learning Spring did not offer a high-school program.

A special-education committee determined that L.B.’s needs could not be met in the public-school system and referred him for a nonpublic high-school placement. The state-approved schools to which he was referred either rejected him or could not meet requirements in his Individualized Education Plan (IEP). L.B.’s parents then enrolled him at the Cooke School and Institute. They said they could not afford its tuition, but Cooke allowed him to attend while they pursued Department of Education funding. Cooke reserved the right to end his enrollment with 30 days’ notice if the Department did not pay.

The parents notified the Department of their plan to enroll L.B. at Cooke and later requested an administrative due-process hearing challenging the Department’s failure to provide an appropriate placement for the 2021–2022 school year. They also requested funding under the law’s “stay-put” provision while the administrative case was pending. A hearing officer found that L.B. had aged out of Learning Spring, that the prior placement was unavailable, and that the Department had not identified a school meeting his IEP needs. The hearing officer concluded that no stay-put placement was available.

The parents then filed this federal case and sought a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction requiring the Department to fund Cooke. The Department opposed the request.

The court’s analysis

Stay-put funding

The court explained that the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act’s stay-put provision generally maintains a child’s current educational placement during an ongoing dispute. That protection ordinarily refers to the last agreed-upon educational program before the parent requested an administrative hearing. It does not ordinarily allow a parent to choose a new school and then require the school district to fund that school as a stay-put placement.

The parties agreed that Learning Spring was L.B.’s last agreed-upon actual placement. The court held that Cooke could not be treated as L.B.’s stay-put placement because his parents enrolled him there before the administrative dispute began. The court also noted that L.B. had aged out of Learning Spring and that no IEP was included in the record, so the court could not determine what placement would satisfy his IEP or whether Cooke complied with those requirements.

The court stated that the parents could pursue retroactive reimbursement for private-school expenses if they ultimately prevailed in the administrative process, but that possibility did not authorize the requested stay-put funding at this stage.

Equitable preliminary-injunction request

The parents alternatively asked the court to change L.B.’s placement to Cooke using the IDEA provision allowing a court to grant appropriate relief. The court applied the usual preliminary-injunction requirements: a likelihood of success, irreparable harm without immediate relief, a favorable balance of hardships, and consistency with the public interest.

The court found no irreparable harm on the current record. L.B. was attending Cooke, which his parents considered appropriate, and Cooke had agreed to provide notice before ending his attendance. The court also noted that the parents had agreed to extensions of the briefing schedule, which weakened their claim that immediate emergency relief was necessary.

The court further questioned whether it had subject-matter jurisdiction because the parents’ administrative proceedings were still pending and appeared to involve the same placement and funding issues. The court said the IDEA generally requires exhaustion of administrative remedies before a federal lawsuit. It also lacked an adequate record because the IEP and the relevant placement criteria were not before it. Because the parents had not shown irreparable harm or a likelihood of success, the court did not address the remaining preliminary-injunction factors.

Disposition

The court denied the plaintiffs’ application for emergency relief, including their request for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. The court separately directed the parties to attend a telephone conference concerning the Department of Education’s contemplated motion to dismiss.