Behlin v. Rite Aid Pharmacy Store

Background

On June 20, 2015, Rite Aid employee Felix Luna called police after seeing Behlin take merchandise from a Rite Aid store. Another employee, Jermaine Williams, followed Behlin outside, grabbed his arm, and demanded that he return the items. Behlin got away, displayed manicure scissors, and threw items onto the street. Luna then threw a metal city trashcan at Behlin, striking his left hip and leg. Behlin reported pain in his lower back, numbness in his left leg, and some swelling.

Police arrested Behlin minutes later. Luna identified him to Victor Gonzalez as the person involved in the Rite Aid incident. Behlin said he told Gonzalez, Damion Brown, and Victor Reyes that his leg hurt and that he needed medical attention; he also alleged that he told Malcial Tuero and Garfield Mead. He was examined after arriving at Rikers Island on June 22, 2015. The medical records did not note injuries to his back or left leg or complaints about them. Behlin was later convicted of robbery, obstructing governmental administration, criminal possession of a weapon, and attempted assault arising from the June 20 incident.

Behlin filed this action against Rite Aid and the City Defendants. The opinion states that Williams and Luna were not proper defendants because they were never successfully served. The court construed Behlin’s pleadings as asserting Section 1983 claims for false arrest against Rite Aid and the City Defendants, denial of medical care against the City Defendants, and excessive force against Rite Aid, along with state-law assault and battery claims against Rite Aid. The court did not consider additional claims raised for the first time in Behlin’s opposition papers.

Summary-judgment standard

The defendants moved for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Summary judgment is appropriate when the record shows no genuine dispute about a fact that could affect the outcome and the moving party is entitled to judgment under the law. The court reviewed the record with special consideration for Behlin’s status as a self-represented litigant, even though he had not submitted the required statement responding to the defendants’ asserted facts.

False-arrest claims

The court granted both motions for summary judgment on Behlin’s false-arrest claims. A Section 1983 claim requires conduct under color of state law—that is, conduct fairly attributable to the government—and a violation of a federal right. A false-arrest claim generally requires confinement intended by the defendant, awareness of the confinement, lack of consent, and confinement that was not legally justified.

The court held that Behlin’s convictions for offenses connected to the arrest defeated his false-arrest claims. The court also held that the record independently established probable cause. Luna identified Behlin at the arrest scene, Behlin had been apprehended near the Rite Aid store, and officers found Rite Aid merchandise in his possession without a receipt. The court stated that probable cause is a complete defense to a false-arrest claim, including a claim against a private party. Although Rite Aid disputed that it was a state actor, the court assumed that status for purposes of analyzing the false-arrest claim and concluded that Behlin had not shown a constitutional deprivation.

Denial of medical care

The court granted the City Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Behlin’s Section 1983 claim for denial of medical care. Because Behlin was a pretrial detainee when he sought treatment, the court analyzed the claim under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment rather than the Eighth Amendment. He had to show that the alleged deprivation involved a sufficiently serious medical condition.

The court found no genuine factual dispute on that issue. Behlin described pain, numbness, and limited swelling but said that nothing was broken. His Rikers Island examination two days later described his back and musculoskeletal condition as normal or unremarkable, with no tenderness, swelling, redness, or loss of range of motion. The court also noted that Behlin did not force the issue of going to the hospital after arriving at central booking. The court concluded that the alleged delay of less than 48 hours, the reported symptoms, and the medical records did not establish a sufficiently serious condition or a constitutional violation. The court declined to reach the City Defendants’ qualified-immunity argument.

Claims against Rite Aid that remain

The court denied Rite Aid’s motion for summary judgment on Behlin’s Section 1983 excessive-force claim and his state-law assault and battery claims. Behlin’s theory was that Williams and Luna, while acting within their work duties, acted together with the City Defendants when they confronted him and Luna threw the trashcan.

Rite Aid argued that neither it nor its employees acted under color of state law. The court explained that a private party may qualify as a state actor when it willfully participates in joint activity with government officials, but merely giving information to police or calling police for help generally is not enough. The court was skeptical that Behlin could prove the police were involved in the alleged assault beyond receiving information from Luna, but it could not resolve the state-action question without a fuller factual record.

The court attributed the incomplete record in part to the truncated discovery period and concluded that Behlin was not responsible for the lack of discovery. It therefore denied summary judgment on the excessive-force, assault, and battery claims. The court lifted any remaining stay, allowed discovery to proceed on those claims, permitted Behlin to take two depositions of relevant individuals of his choosing, and allowed Rite Aid to depose Behlin. The order required the remaining parties to submit a proposed case-management plan for that discovery.