Ogbolu v. The Trustees of Columbia University in the City of New York

Background

Brandon E. Ogbolu, proceeding without a lawyer, sued the Trustees of Columbia University in the City of New York, Lee C. Bollinger, Jane E. Booth, Patricia S. Catapano, and Andrew W. Schilling. Ogbolu graduated from Columbia College in 2012 and alleged that student debt he accumulated there was converted into two private student loans. After communications about the loans, Ogbolu and Defendants finalized a settlement agreement on October 29, 2019.

The settlement required Defendants to refund Ogbolu’s payments, totaling $35,779.80, and provide a settlement payment. It also released Columbia and other released parties from claims relating to specified repayment agreements, loan servicing, collection, and credit-reporting activity occurring through October 29, 2019. Ogbolu later alleged that Defendants had unlawfully made the loans, improperly induced him to settle, breached the settlement, discriminated against him because of Asperger syndrome, and caused emotional distress. He also challenged a tax form that initially reported the refund as income; the opinion states that Defendants sent a corrected form about two weeks after Ogbolu reported the error.

Ogbolu’s third amended complaint asserted 33 federal, state, and local claims and sought $175 million in compensatory and punitive damages, fees, costs, and interest. He also moved for a preliminary injunction preventing Columbia from converting student tuition debt into private student loans.

Rulings on the Complaint

The court considered the settlement agreement because the complaint relied on it and referred to it extensively. Applying New York law, the court explained that a clear release generally bars claims covered by it unless the plaintiff shows a sufficient reason to invalidate the release, such as duress, illegality, fraud, or mutual mistake.

The court rejected Ogbolu’s argument that undue influence made the settlement invalid. It concluded that the alleged lengthy negotiations, lack of legal representation, and conduct involving his communications amounted at most to pressure, not conduct that destroyed his free will. The court also held that Ogbolu ratified the release by waiting roughly 17 months before seeking to repudiate it.

The court rejected Ogbolu’s fraud, fraudulent-inducement, fraudulent-concealment, and negligent-misrepresentation theories because they concerned the same loan practices covered by the release, rather than a separate fraud about the settlement itself. The court therefore held that the settlement was not void and dismissed claims barred by it. The opinion’s footnote states that Counts 1–15 and 28–32 were wholly dismissed and that Counts 16–22 were partially dismissed to the extent they involved conduct covered by the settlement.

The court dismissed claims based on federal and state criminal statutes because private citizens generally cannot bring criminal charges and Ogbolu did not identify a private right to sue under the statutes he cited. It also held that he lacked standing to sue under New York Executive Law § 63(12), which authorizes actions by the New York Attorney General.

The court dismissed Ogbolu’s breach-of-contract claim concerning the mislabeled tax form. The settlement required a refund but did not specify how the refund had to be reported. Because Ogbolu received the required refund and a corrected form, the court held that the form error did not breach the agreement. The court also held that Ogbolu had not adequately alleged recoverable damages. His claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing was dismissed as duplicative because it relied on the same conduct as the contract claim.

The court dismissed Ogbolu’s disability-discrimination claims under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, the New York State Human Rights Law, and the New York Civil Rights Law. The court held that he did not allege facts showing that Defendants denied him opportunities, treated him differently from people without Asperger syndrome, or acted with discriminatory intent. The court separately applied the more liberal standard under the New York City Human Rights Law but reached the same result, finding insufficient allegations of discriminatory intent or differential treatment. The related aiding-and-abetting claims also failed because Ogbolu had not adequately alleged an underlying discrimination violation.

The court dismissed the negligent- and intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claims because labeling the refund as income, and failing to respond to concerns after correcting the error, did not amount to the extreme or outrageous conduct required under New York law. The negligent-supervision-and-retention claim against Columbia was dismissed because Ogbolu did not plead facts showing that Columbia knew or should have known, before the alleged injury, that an employee had a propensity to engage in the conduct at issue.

Preliminary Injunction and Final Disposition

The court denied the preliminary injunction. Because the underlying claims were dismissed, the court concluded that Ogbolu could not show a likelihood of success on the merits or serious questions supporting an injunction.

Ogbolu requested permission to amend again if the dismissal motion was granted. The court denied that request because he had already received several opportunities to amend and further amendment would be futile. Judge Oetken’s conclusion states that Defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint with prejudice was granted, Ogbolu’s motion for a preliminary injunction was denied, and the case was closed.