Di Pompo v. Village of Brewster

Background

Richard Di Pompo’s amended complaint arose from a November 8, 2019 traffic stop. He alleged that he had not run a stop sign but was pulled over and ticketed for doing so. Because the rental vehicle’s registration tag appeared expired, he was also ticketed for driving an unregistered vehicle, and the vehicle was impounded. He declined a ride from the officer and left.

Di Pompo asserted claims based on the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Amendments, along with claims described as hate crime, conspiracy, negligence, and intentional infliction of emotional distress under state law. The defendants moved to dismiss all claims. In opposition, Di Pompo addressed only the Fourth Amendment and intentional-infliction claims.

Court’s analysis

The court applied the Rule 12(b)(6) standard, which asks whether the complaint alleges enough facts to make a claim plausible. Because Di Pompo did not respond to the defendants’ arguments concerning the other claims, the court treated those claims as abandoned and dismissed them.

The court allowed the Fourth Amendment claim concerning the initial traffic stop to proceed against Officer M. Mendelson. A traffic stop must be supported by probable cause or reasonable suspicion that a traffic violation or criminal activity occurred. Because Di Pompo denied running the stop sign, the court found that he plausibly alleged that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion or probable cause. The court noted that any damages for this alleged violation might be limited to the period before the officer observed the expired registration.

The court dismissed the same traffic-stop claim against the Village of Brewster. A municipality cannot be held liable under federal civil-rights law merely because it employs an officer who allegedly violated someone’s rights. The complaint did not allege that a Village policy or custom caused Di Pompo’s injury.

The court dismissed the Fourth Amendment challenge to the tickets. It explained that issuing a non-felony summons before arraignment, without additional restrictions, does not constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure. The court also dismissed the challenge to the impoundment because Di Pompo conceded that the vehicle lacked valid registration, providing probable cause for the impoundment.

The court dismissed the intentional-infliction claim. Under New York law, that claim requires extreme and outrageous conduct, an intent to cause severe emotional distress, a causal connection, and severe emotional distress. The court found that the alleged conduct did not approach the required level of outrageousness, that this claim could not be based on conduct covered by another tort, and that Di Pompo alleged no facts showing that Officer Mendelson intended to cause emotional distress.

Disposition

The court ordered that all claims be dismissed except the claim against Officer Mendelson alleging that he pulled Di Pompo over without reasonable suspicion. The court did not expressly add a “with prejudice” or “without prejudice” designation to these dispositions. It directed the parties to attend a telephonic conference on March 9, 2022, confer about a discovery schedule, and terminated the pending motion.