Donohue v. Hochul

Background

New York generally required schoolchildren over age two who could medically tolerate face coverings to wear masks in certain settings, including schools. New York City’s Department of Education implemented the requirement. The mandate incorporated recommendations from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, including possible exceptions for people who could not wear a mask because of a disability.

Patrick Donohue, Angela Nolan, and Marie Farrell—parents and guardians of S.J.D., S.N., and E.F., respectively—challenged the mandate. The children were described as having a traumatic brain injury, a learning disability, and autism. The parents alleged that masks interfered with breathing, communication, speech development, or educational services, and that the mandate conflicted with the children’s individual education plans. They sought a declaration that the mandate was unlawful and an injunction stopping state and city officials and entities from implementing it.

The complaint asserted claims under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. It also asserted constitutional claims involving the First, Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and claims under New York law. The parents moved for a preliminary injunction. The City Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and, alternatively, Rule 12(b)(6).

Standing

The court rejected the City Defendants’ argument that the case should be dismissed because Patrick Donohue lacked standing. The court explained that when multiple plaintiffs seek the same relief, the case may proceed if at least one plaintiff has standing. It found that Marie Farrell had standing at this stage because the complaint and a letter from E.F.’s pediatrician adequately alleged that mask-wearing caused an injury that an injunction could alleviate.

Federal statutory claims

The court dismissed the claims alleging that the mask mandate violated the children’s individual education plans. Although the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act generally requires administrative exhaustion, the court accepted the complaint’s allegation that the parents had filed administrative complaints and noted exceptions to exhaustion where the process would be futile or inadequate.

The court nevertheless concluded that the parents had not plausibly alleged that the schools failed to implement the individual education plans. The plans did not state that the children would not wear masks, and the complaint did not identify a plan provision requiring that result. The court also concluded that adding a mask requirement was not a significant failure to implement the plans. For the same reasons, the related Section 504 claims did not state a claim.

The court also dismissed the claims under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act’s “stay-put” provision, which generally preserves a child’s current educational placement while administrative proceedings are pending. The court concluded that the parents had not alleged a change in educational placement. The individual education plans did not address masks, and the mandate did not change the children’s general educational programs, classes, attention, or services.

The court dismissed the Americans with Disabilities Act claims because the parents had not identified authority establishing that the Act prohibits mandatory restraints, and because the court concluded that the mask mandate was not a restraint. The court also dismissed the emergency-use-authorization claim because the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act does not provide a private right of action to enforce alleged violations of the authorization.

Federal constitutional claims

The court dismissed the First Amendment claims. It found that allegations about Governor Kathleen Hochul’s statements at houses of worship concerned vaccination rather than masking and did not plausibly show that the mask mandate advanced religion. The court also found insufficient allegations that the mandate advanced humanism. Other First Amendment theories failed because the mask rules described the permitted types of face coverings clearly enough, and the complaint did not plausibly allege a violation based on false speech, incitement, or freedom of association.

The Fourth Amendment claims failed because the complaint alleged a requirement to wear masks, not physical force, a show of authority restraining liberty, or circumstances that would make a reasonable person believe they were not free to leave. The Eighth Amendment claims failed because that amendment does not apply without a formal adjudication of guilt, such as a criminal conviction.

The court dismissed the procedural due process claims because the mask mandate was legislative in nature: it applied generally and prospectively. The court also found no plausible allegation that the mandate deprived students of a protected interest. Although students may have a protected interest in public education, the complaint did not allege that the students were suspended, expelled, or otherwise excluded from the educational process.

The substantive due process claims also failed. The court concluded that the mandate did not undermine family integrity or privacy, did not violate recognized rights to personal autonomy or bodily integrity, did not shock the conscience, and did not unlawfully interfere with parental authority over education. The court viewed the mandate as a reasonable school regulation adopted during a public-health emergency.

The court dismissed the equal protection claims because the parents did not allege discrimination against a protected class, selective enforcement, or treatment as a “class of one.” To the extent the parents claimed disability-based unequal treatment, the court concluded that the mandate and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act’s stay-put provision satisfied rational-basis review. The court also dismissed the independent claims under the Ninth Amendment, Section 1983, and the rule associated with municipal liability under Monell because the parents had not plausibly identified a constitutional deprivation.

State-law claims and preliminary injunction

After dismissing all federal claims, the court declined to retain supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims. Those claims alleged that the mandate exceeded state statutory authority and violated New York education law and the New York Constitution. The court dismissed the state-law claims without prejudice to refiling in state court.

The court denied the preliminary-injunction motion. Because the complaint did not state a federal claim and the court was not retaining the state claims, the parents could not show a likelihood of success on the merits.

Disposition

The court granted the City Defendants’ motion to dismiss and dismissed the complaint in its entirety. The federal claims were dismissed with prejudice because the defects were substantive and amendment would be futile. The state-law claims were dismissed without prejudice to refiling in state court. Judge J. Paul Oetken denied the motion for a preliminary injunction and directed the Clerk of Court to close the motions and the case.