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S.D.N.Y.OtherFiled Feb. 25, 2022

Google LLC v. Dmitry Starovikov

Judge
Denise Cote
Docket
1:21-cv-10260
Court
U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
Pages
3
Civil Procedure
In one sentence

In Google LLC v. Dmitry Starovikov, attorney Litvak asked Judge Cote to pause default-judgment deadlines and schedule a motion to undo default.

Who this affects

The document concerns Google LLC and defendants Dmitry Starovikov and Alexander Filippov, particularly the defendants’ effort to respond to the clerk’s entry of default and to delay Google’s planned default-judgment motion.

What happened

The document in Google LLC v. Dmitry Starovikov is a defense lawyer’s letter, not a court ruling. Google sued Dmitry Starovikov, Alexander Filippov, and others, alleging claims involving a botnet and malware under several federal statutes and state-law theories.

The letter says the clerk entered default on February 8, 2022, and that counsel appeared for Starovikov and Filippov later that month. On the defendants’ behalf, Igor Litvak asked the court to suspend the deadline for Google’s default-judgment and permanent-injunction motion and proposed a schedule for a motion to set aside the entry of default.

The supplied document does not state that Judge Denise L. Cote granted or denied these requests. It describes the defendants’ planned arguments that the default was not willful, that Google would not be prejudiced, and that the defendants had potentially meritorious defenses.

The detailed version

For law students, journalists, and other readers who want the full reasoning

Case
Google LLC v. Dmitry Starovikov · No. 1:21-cv-10260
Judge
Denise Cote
Date
Feb. 25, 2022

Document and procedural posture

The supplied text is a February 24, 2022 letter from Igor Litvak, counsel for defendants Dmitry Starovikov and Alexander Filippov, addressed to Judge Denise L. Cote. It is not an opinion or order and does not report a ruling by the court. The case information supplied with the document lists February 25, 2022 as the filing date.

Background

According to the letter, Google LLC filed the action on December 2, 2021, seeking monetary and injunctive relief against the defendants. The complaint asserted claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, and the Lanham Act, along with common-law claims for unfair competition and unjust enrichment. The letter also says Google sought relief concerning the alleged operation of the “Glupteba Enterprise,” described in the filing as involving a botnet and malware.

The letter states that the court authorized alternative service by an order dated December 16, 2021. It further states that, after a January 31, 2022 letter from Google, the court set a schedule requiring Google to seek entry of default under Rule 55(a) on February 7, 2022, and to file a motion for default judgment and a permanent injunction within 21 days after any entry of default. The clerk entered default on February 8, 2022. Litvak says he was retained on February 16, 2022, and filed notices of appearance for Starovikov and Filippov on February 16 and February 22, respectively.

Defendants’ requests

Litvak asked the court to suspend the existing deadline for Google’s default-judgment and permanent-injunction motion. He characterized that deadline as unnecessary because the defendants had appeared through counsel. He also proposed a briefing schedule for an anticipated motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(c) to set aside the clerk’s entry of default: defendants’ opening brief on March 28, 2022; Google’s response on April 28, 2022; and defendants’ reply on May 15, 2022.

Legal standard described in the letter

The letter explains that Rule 55 uses two steps before a default judgment may be entered: the clerk enters default when a party fails to plead or otherwise defend, and the party seeking judgment then applies to the court for a default judgment. It states that a court may set aside an entry of default for “good cause.” The letter identifies three factors commonly considered: whether the default was willful, whether setting it aside would prejudice the opposing party, and whether the defaulting party presents a potentially meritorious defense. It also notes the preference for resolving disputes on their merits.

Disposition

The supplied document contains no ruling by Judge Cote. It does not say that the court granted, denied, or otherwise resolved either of the defendants’ requests.

The authoritative version

Read the full 3-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.

Open opinion PDF →
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