Kravitz v. State of New York

Background

Jay S. Kravitz, proceeding without a lawyer, sued Samuel Purcell, Adolphus Baker, Luis Andreu, David McCray, Gregory St. Victor, David McMahon, Joseph Wassweiler, and John Zupan under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He alleged that the defendants violated his First Amendment right to freely practice his religion by preventing him from properly observing Shavuot while he was incarcerated at Downstate Correctional Facility.

Shavuot began on the evening of June 3 and ended on the evening of June 5, 2014. Under the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision’s religious-holiday calendar, Jewish inmates were scheduled to have one hour and 45 minutes for services and meals on June 3 and June 4. On June 3, Kravitz was given a kosher peanut-butter sandwich in a lobby rather than being allowed to continue to the dining room; he returned to his cell, ate, and prayed there. On June 4, he was escorted to the dining room, where he and other Jewish inmates received a festive kosher meal and began prayers. Kravitz claimed that correction officers interrupted the prayers, pressured the group to eat quickly, and used profanity. He returned to his housing block at approximately 8:45 p.m.

Motions and Evidence

Defendants moved for summary judgment, which asks whether the evidence shows that no important factual dispute requires a trial. Kravitz filed a cross-motion seeking summary judgment in his favor. Defendants argued that the incidents did not substantially burden Kravitz’s sincerely held religious beliefs and that several defendants were not personally involved. They also argued that the conduct was, at most, negligence and that qualified immunity protected them from liability. Kravitz argued that Shavuot was a highly important holiday and that Defendants had not shown an emergency or other justification for limiting the observance.

The court gave Kravitz the special consideration generally afforded to a party without a lawyer but held that he still needed admissible evidence supporting his claims. Kravitz did not submit a required factual response to Defendants’ statement of undisputed facts. The court nevertheless independently reviewed his statements, affidavit, deposition testimony, and other record evidence.

Personal Involvement

A person sued under § 1983 generally must have personally participated in the alleged constitutional violation. The court found that the undisputed evidence showed that Zupan, Purcell, Baker, St. Victor, McCray, and Andreu were not personally involved in the alleged deprivation. The court therefore granted summary judgment to those six defendants.

The court rejected Kravitz’s argument that their identification in a court-directed response identifying possible officers established their involvement. The response was intended to suggest possible identities based on limited information, not to admit that those individuals participated in the events. The court also noted that Kravitz lacked personal knowledge supporting his claim that these defendants were present.

The court did not grant summary judgment to McMahon and Wassweiler based on lack of personal involvement because Defendants had not adequately raised that evidentiary point in their briefing. The court instead decided the claims against them on the substantial-burden issue.

Free Exercise Claim

For an incarcerated person to succeed on a religious-free-exercise claim, the challenged conduct must substantially burden sincerely held religious beliefs. A substantial burden means that the government places significant pressure on the person to change behavior or violate religious beliefs. The court accepted, for purposes of the motions, that Kravitz’s beliefs were sincerely held.

The court rejected Defendants’ argument that missing one religious service can never be a substantial burden. It explained that missing one service may qualify when the service is central or important to the person’s religious practice. The court stated that, if McMahon and Wassweiler had caused Kravitz to miss the Shavuot prayers and meal entirely, the single missed celebration would have been a substantial burden because of Shavuot’s importance.

But the court found that the undisputed evidence showed that Kravitz’s observance on June 4 was shortened, not denied. He was able to congregate with other Jewish inmates, pray, and eat a festive kosher meal. Because he was able to observe Shavuot, even though the observance was shortened and possibly substandard, the court held that he could not establish a substantial burden on his religious practice.

The court therefore did not decide Defendants’ alternative arguments that the conduct was only negligence or that qualified immunity applied.

Disposition

Judge Kenneth M. Karas granted Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and denied Kravitz’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. The court directed the Clerk to enter judgment for Defendants, terminate the pending motions, mail Kravitz a copy of the opinion, and close the case.