Warren v. The Stop & Shop Supermarket Company LLC

Background

Kari Warren filed a putative class action against The Stop & Shop Supermarket, LLC concerning its Stop & Shop-brand “Graham Crackers — Honey.” She alleged that the packaging misrepresented the product as being mainly made from whole grains and as being sweetened and flavored mainly or exclusively with honey. The amended complaint asserted claims under New York General Business Law §§ 349 and 350, which address deceptive consumer practices and false advertising; negligent misrepresentation; breach of express and implied warranties; the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act; fraud; and unjust enrichment. Warren also sought money damages and an injunction requiring changes to the label.

The ingredient list identified enriched flour first, followed by graham flour, sugar, and honey. Warren alleged that this ordering showed the product contained more enriched flour than graham flour and more sugar than honey. She also alleged that the packaging did not disclose the product’s artificial flavoring or the percentage of honey and graham flour.

Rule 12(b)(6) standard

The court reviewed the motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint states a legally sufficient claim. At this stage, the court accepted the complaint’s factual allegations as true and drew reasonable inferences in Warren’s favor. The complaint had to contain enough factual matter to make the asserted claims plausible, rather than merely possible or speculative.

Consumer-protection claims involving “honey”

The court granted the motion as to Warren’s New York consumer-protection claims based on the word “honey.” Examining the packaging as a whole, the court concluded that a reasonable consumer would understand “honey” primarily as a flavor description, not as a representation that honey was the predominant flavor source or sweetener. The label did not say that the crackers were “made with honey,” “made with real honey,” or “sweetened with pure honey.” The court therefore concluded that consumers could understand the product to contain some honey while also containing other sweeteners.

To the extent Warren attempted to assert a separate claim based directly on alleged violations of Food and Drug Administration regulations, the court dismissed that claim because those regulations do not provide a private right of action. The court ultimately dismissed the honey-related consumer-protection claims with prejudice.

Consumer-protection claims involving “graham”

The court denied the motion as to Warren’s New York General Business Law §§ 349 and 350 claims based on the word “graham.” Warren alleged that reasonable consumers could understand “graham crackers” to mean crackers made mainly from whole-grain graham flour, while the ingredient list showed that enriched flour was more predominant than graham flour.

The court held that it could not decide as a matter of law, at the pleading stage, that no reasonable consumer would be misled. It noted that determining what consumers understand from this particular packaging could require evidence such as consumer surveys or expert testimony. The court also rejected the defendant’s federal-preemption argument at this stage. Although federal food-labeling law can preempt state requirements that are different from federal requirements, the defendant’s argument depended on factual assertions about the common usage of “graham cracker” that went beyond the complaint. The court therefore allowed these “graham” consumer-protection claims to proceed. It also dismissed with prejudice any separate claim based directly on alleged FDA violations because no private right of action exists to enforce those regulations.

Negligent misrepresentation

The court granted the motion and dismissed the negligent-misrepresentation claim. Under New York law, this claim requires a special relationship imposing a duty to provide accurate information. The court found that the relationship between Warren and the defendant was an ordinary buyer-seller relationship, not one approaching contractual privity or involving the special trust or expertise required for this claim. The dismissal was with prejudice.

Warranty claims and Magnuson-Moss claim

The court granted the motion as to the express-warranty and implied-warranty-of-merchantability claims. New York law requires a buyer to give the seller timely notice of an alleged warranty breach. Warren alleged only that she “provided or will provide” notice, which the court found too equivocal to show that timely notice had actually been given. The court applied the notice requirement to both warranty claims and dismissed them with prejudice.

The court also granted the motion as to Warren’s Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act claim. Because that federal claim depended on a viable state-law express or implied warranty claim, it failed for the same reasons. It was dismissed with prejudice.

Fraud and unjust enrichment

The court granted the motion as to fraud. Warren’s only allegation concerning fraudulent intent was that the defendant’s intent was shown by its failure to identify the product accurately and by representing less predominant ingredients as predominant. The court held that this did not adequately plead an intent to defraud, particularly because the package accurately listed the ingredients. The fraud claim was dismissed with prejudice.

The court also granted the motion as to unjust enrichment. It found that Warren’s unjust-enrichment claim merely repeated the same factual allegations and liability theory underlying her other claims, making it duplicative. That claim was dismissed with prejudice.

Injunctive relief

The court denied Warren’s request for injunctive relief because she lacked standing to seek it. A plaintiff seeking an injunction must show a real and immediate threat of future injury. The court reasoned that Warren knew about the alleged labeling problem and had alleged that she would not buy the product, or would pay less for it, if she knew the truth. Her stated intention to buy the product again only if its label became lawful did not show that she was likely to suffer the same deception again. The request for injunctive relief was dismissed with prejudice.

Leave to amend and disposition

Warren had already amended her complaint after receiving notice of the alleged pleading deficiencies. She did not explain what additional facts would cure the problems identified by the defendant and the court. The court therefore denied further amendment and dismissed with prejudice all claims it had dismissed.

The court granted in part and denied in part the defendant’s motion to dismiss. It granted the motion as to the “honey” consumer-protection claims; negligent misrepresentation; express and implied warranty; Magnuson-Moss; fraud; unjust enrichment; and injunctive relief, dismissing all those claims with prejudice. It denied the motion as to the New York consumer-protection claims involving “graham.” The court directed the defendant to answer those surviving claims and directed the parties to submit a case-management plan and scheduling order.