Starks v. Metropolitan Transportation Authority

Background

Parti Starks, an African-American female who had worked as an MTA police officer for approximately 19 years, sued the Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA). She alleged that the MTA and its police department discriminated against her based on race and gender by failing to promote her to sergeant.

According to the amended complaint, promotion to sergeant required taking a written examination and being placed on a promotional list. Starks took the 2014 examination and ranked 72nd on the resulting list. The MTA promoted officers from that list through rank 62 before issuing a new list based on a 2018 examination. Starks did not take the 2018 examination and was not included on its list. She alleged that the MTA stopped promoting officers from the 2014 list and administered the new examination to avoid promoting African-American and female officers, including her.

Starks asserted intentional-discrimination and disparate-impact claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the New York State Human Rights Law, and the New York City Human Rights Law. She also asserted claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983. The MTA moved to dismiss the amended complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint states a legally sufficient claim.

Title VII claims

The court held that Starks’s Title VII claims were time barred. In New York, a person generally must file a discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) within 300 days of the alleged discriminatory act. Starks filed her charge on April 16, 2019.

The court concluded that Starks should have known on June 4, 2018—the date the 2018 promotional list was published—that she was no longer eligible for promotion. The court reasoned that she knew promotions were made from promotional lists, knew that a list remained effective until a new list was established, took the 2014 examination, did not take the 2018 examination, and knew that the 2018 list contained the results of that examination. The charge was therefore filed 316 days after the date on which she should have known of the alleged discriminatory act, more than 300 days later.

The court also rejected Starks’s attempt to use a continuing-violation theory to extend the filing period. It noted that she had not asserted that theory in her EEOC charge. The court further held that the alleged failure to promote was a discrete discriminatory act, not an ongoing violation, even though Starks characterized the MTA’s examination and ranking practices as a continuing policy. All Title VII claims were dismissed.

Section 1981 and Section 1983 claims

Starks conceded in her opposition brief that she could not challenge dismissal of her claim under Section 1981. The court therefore dismissed that claim.

The court dismissed the Section 1983 claim as well. It held that Starks could not bring a Section 1983 claim against the MTA based on the Fifth Amendment because the Fifth Amendment governs the federal government and federal employees, while Starks’s own pleading identified the MTA as a state agency.

As to the Fourteenth Amendment, the court explained that a facially neutral policy’s unequal effects, by themselves, do not establish an equal-protection violation. The amended complaint described a policy of ranking applicants solely by their written-examination scores. The court treated Starks’s allegations as asserting intentional discrimination, but found them insufficient because they were conclusory. The court also held that the statistics concerning the promotional lists and the number of African-American sergeants were insufficient, standing alone, to support an inference of discriminatory intent.

State-law claims and leave to amend

After dismissing all federal claims, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining claims under the New York State Human Rights Law and the New York City Human Rights Law. Supplemental jurisdiction is the court’s authority to hear related state-law claims alongside federal claims.

The court denied leave to amend. Starks had not requested another opportunity to amend, had not indicated that she possessed additional facts that would cure the pleading problems, and had already amended her complaint once after receiving the MTA’s anticipated dismissal arguments.

Disposition

Judge Mary Kay Vyskocil granted the MTA’s motion to dismiss. The court dismissed the amended complaint with prejudice, denied leave to amend, directed the clerk to terminate the motion, and closed the case.