Carr v. New York City Transit Authority

Background

Jennifer Berkeley Carr, an African-American woman of Caribbean descent born in 1955, worked for the New York City Transit Authority in its Capital Programs division. She sued the Authority, Marva Brown, and David Chan, asserting claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Her amended complaint asserted eleven causes of action involving alleged discrimination, retaliation, and a hostile work environment.

Carr applied for two positions. In 2013, she was not selected for a Senior Director position, which went to Joseph DiLorenzo, a white man. In 2014, she was not selected for another Senior Director position, which went to Chan. Brown was involved in both decisions. Carr later filed complaints with the Authority’s equal-employment office, alleging discrimination and unfair promotion practices. She also complained about Chan’s supervision and later performance reviews.

Carr received “Good” ratings for 2014 and 2015, followed by “Needs Improvement” ratings for 2016 and 2017. The court noted that the later ratings disqualified her from receiving wage increases. Carr argued that these actions were retaliation for her complaints.

Motion and legal standards

The defendants moved for summary judgment on all claims. Summary judgment is a decision before trial when the evidence shows that no reasonable jury could find for the nonmoving party. The court applied the burden-shifting framework used for employment discrimination and retaliation claims. Under that framework, an employee must first present evidence supporting an initial claim; the employer must then give a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action; and the employee must present evidence that the stated reason was a cover for unlawful discrimination or retaliation.

Discrimination claims

The court found that Carr was qualified for the two positions and that the promotion decisions were adverse employment actions. It also found that the circumstances were sufficient to support an initial inference of discrimination, including the differences in race, sex, and age between Carr and some of the selected candidates.

The defendants, however, provided nondiscriminatory reasons for their decisions. Chan had about thirteen more years of experience at the Authority, an electrical-engineering background, and a strong interview. DiLorenzo had about eleven more years at the Authority and a technical background. The court stated that it had to respect the employer’s choice among qualified candidates.

The court concluded that Carr did not provide evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that the stated reasons were a pretext for discrimination. Evidence that Brown or others preferred the selected candidates or disliked Carr did not, without more, show that race, sex, or age influenced the promotion decisions. The court therefore granted summary judgment on the discrimination causes of action identified as the first, fourth, sixth, eighth, and ninth causes of action.

Retaliation claims

The court found that Carr’s complaints to the Authority’s equal-employment office were protected activity. It also found that the “Needs Improvement” ratings could qualify as adverse actions because they prevented her from receiving wage increases.

The court nevertheless rejected Carr’s causation theory. Carr relied on timing, but the record showed that Chan completed a draft of her 2014 review before the date of the EEO charge on which she relied. The court also found that the gap between Carr’s June 2015 communication to Chan and the 2016 review—received in April 2017—was too long by itself to establish a connection.

The court further concluded that Carr had not shown a legally sufficient retaliatory hostile work environment. She did not explain how the performance review or other evidence showed conduct that was severe or pervasive enough to change the conditions of her employment. The defendants also offered evidence that they believed Carr was not performing adequately and was difficult to work with. Carr did not show that retaliation was the reason the later employment actions would not otherwise have occurred.

The court stated that Carr had abandoned any standalone hostile-work-environment claims because her opposition brief addressed hostile work environment only as part of her retaliation theory. The court also stated that she had abandoned any claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that may have appeared in the amended complaint.

Disposition

The court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. It directed the Clerk of Court to terminate the motion at docket 47 and close the case. The opinion did not add a “with prejudice” or “without prejudice” qualification to the ruling.