Singh v. Knuckles, Komosinski & Manfro, LLP

Background

Mandip K. Singh brought claims against her former employer, Knuckles, Komosinski & Manfro, LLP (KKM), and her former supervisor, Debbie Bhoorasingh, individually. She alleged that the defendants unlawfully terminated her employment because of her pregnancy and gender under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the New York State Human Rights Law. A trial was scheduled for the week of April 4, 2022.

The defendants filed a motion in limine, which is a request to decide before trial whether particular evidence may be presented. They sought to prevent Singh from testifying about three subjects: her job performance at KKM; her anxiety, irritable bowel syndrome, or other medical diagnosis; and whether medical professionals required her to be on bed rest or made her physically unable to work during her pregnancy.

Job-performance testimony

The court denied the request to exclude Singh’s testimony about her job performance. It ruled that her testimony that she was an “exemplary employee” was relevant to whether she was qualified for her position. The court also found relevant her testimony that supervisors complimented her work because those statements could potentially be admissions by the defendants concerning her qualifications.

The court further held that Singh could testify that the defendants did not object to her absences until after her pregnancy. The court found that this testimony could support an inference of discrimination and was relevant to the defendants’ motive. The court concluded that the evidence’s value was not outweighed by concerns about unfair prejudice, confusion, or misleading the jury. Singh’s opinion testimony still had to be based on her own perception, and the defendants could cross-examine her and raise objections at trial.

Testimony about anxiety and irritable bowel syndrome

The court denied as premature the request to bar Singh from using the terms “anxiety,” “irritable bowel syndrome,” and “IBS.” It held that she could testify from personal knowledge about her emotional and physical condition before, during, and after her termination, and about seeking treatment from medical professionals.

The court distinguished personal observations from expert medical testimony. Singh could not testify about medical causation, a medical diagnosis, or matters requiring scientific, technical, or specialized knowledge. The court stated that using “anxiety” to describe nervousness or uneasiness could be permissible. But testimony claiming that she had an official medical diagnosis of anxiety or IBS would be excluded because the record did not support those diagnoses.

Pregnancy-related medical treatment

The defendants also sought to exclude testimony about the medical basis for two notes excusing Singh from work during specified periods in June 2017. The notes did not state the medical basis for her absences. Based on Singh’s representation that she would testify only about her own symptoms, medical visits, reasons for seeking treatment, and compliance with requests for additional documentation, the court denied this part of the motion as premature.

The court again emphasized that Singh was not an expert witness. She could testify about facts within her personal knowledge, but she could not testify about the medical basis or cause of a medical condition. The defendants could object if her testimony went beyond those limits.

Disposition

Judge Nelson S. Roman denied the defendants’ motion in limine. The ruling allowed the challenged testimony subject to the stated limits and to objections during trial. The court directed the Clerk of Court to terminate the motion listed at ECF No. 55.