Chavez v. Finney

Background

Juan Pablo Chavez proceeded without a lawyer and sued Sergeant William Finney, Officer Stephen Streicher, and Officer Anthony Tortorice, whom the opinion identifies as officers of the Port Authority Police Department. The case arose from an April 20, 2019 encounter at the Port Authority Bus Terminal. According to Streicher, Chavez was yelling and cursing at Finney, continued causing a disturbance, and did not leave after being asked to do so. Streicher issued Chavez a disorderly conduct summons. During that process, officers discovered a 2013 bench warrant from Queens County Criminal Court for Chavez’s failure to appear on a fare-beating ticket. The officers maintained that Chavez was arrested because of that warrant, not because of the summons.

Chavez gave a different account. He said he was participating in religious worship and that Finney approached him and said, “You talk too god damn much.” Chavez alleged that the officers then unlawfully searched and detained him, interfered with his religious activity, and issued the summons in retaliation for his speech. He also asserted claims involving false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, discrimination, due process, several constitutional amendments, slander, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, the Hobbs Act, and the Lanham Act.

Motions and rulings

The court denied Chavez’s motion to preclude documents that the defendants provided after discovery closed. The court concluded that, even if the disclosure was late, the failure was harmless because Chavez already knew the information in the records and was not unfairly surprised.

The court granted in part and denied in part the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Summary judgment is a ruling without a trial when the evidence shows that no reasonable jury could find for the opposing party on a required issue. The court first dismissed all claims against Tortorice because the record contained no evidence of his personal involvement. The remaining analysis therefore concerned Finney and Streicher.

First Amendment retaliation

The court allowed Chavez’s First Amendment retaliation claim to proceed only insofar as it challenged the issuance of the disorderly conduct summons. Chavez’s sworn allegations that he was worshiping, that Finney commented on how much he talked, and that the summons followed shortly afterward created a factual dispute about whether the summons was motivated by retaliation for protected speech. The court also found a dispute about whether the officers had probable cause to issue the summons: the defendants said Chavez was yelling, cursing, and disobeying commands, while Chavez said he was worshiping and responding respectfully. Because a court cannot resolve that credibility dispute at summary judgment, summary judgment was denied on this part of the retaliation claim.

Summary judgment was granted on Chavez’s retaliation claim to the extent it challenged his arrest. The court held that the bench warrant supplied probable cause for the arrest, regardless of whether the officers had a retaliatory motive. The court also held that Chavez’s statements about hospital staff telling him the underlying charge had been dismissed were hearsay and that the court records showed the charge was not dismissed until after the arrest.

False arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution

Summary judgment was granted on these claims. As to the arrest, the undisputed existence of probable cause defeated the claims. As to any detention before the warrant-based arrest, Chavez did not provide facts showing that he was actually confined while the summons was issued or before the arrest. The court also granted summary judgment on malicious prosecution based on the disorderly conduct case because that proceeding had not ended and remained pending.

Search and seizure of property

The court granted summary judgment on Chavez’s claim that officers unlawfully searched or seized his violin case, papers, wallet, and other property. Because the arrest was lawful, the seizure and impoundment of property on or near Chavez’s person were reasonable. The defendants also submitted unrebutted evidence of standardized Port Authority inventory-search rules, including rules requiring wallets to be removed and examined. The court found Chavez’s general allegation that the property was searched “without reason/cause” insufficient to create a jury question.

Due process and equal protection

The court granted summary judgment on the due process claim because the alleged conduct was covered by the Fourth Amendment rather than the more general substantive-due-process theory. The court also granted summary judgment on any procedural due process claim because it duplicated the rejected Fourth Amendment theories and Chavez did not allege that the defendants unlawfully retained or destroyed his property.

The court granted summary judgment on the equal protection claim, which it treated as a selective-enforcement claim based on race, religion, and socioeconomic status. Chavez did not provide evidence that he was treated differently from similarly situated people or that the defendants acted because of those characteristics.

Other claims

The court dismissed Chavez’s Double Jeopardy claim because the relevant proceedings had not involved a determination of guilt and the underlying charge was still pending when he was arrested. It dismissed his Eighth Amendment claims because he did not allege a conviction and the records contradicted his account of the timing of his court appearance. It dismissed his Sixth Amendment claims because the allegations concerned court representation and prosecutorial conduct, not personal involvement by the remaining defendants.

The court also dismissed the Eleventh Amendment, Lanham Act, RICO, Hobbs Act, and slander claims. The Eleventh Amendment does not give individuals a claim against defendants. The Lanham Act does not protect a non-owner who claims confusion from another party’s mark. Chavez’s allegations about a stolen $2 bill and a “gang” did not support RICO or Hobbs Act liability. His slander claim failed because he did not allege special economic harm, did not show that the alleged accusation of fare-beating involved a sufficiently serious crime for slander per se, and did not allege that the statement about his sexual orientation was false.

Additional requests and disposition

The court denied Chavez’s request to reopen discovery because he did not show that he had acted diligently or explain why he could not seek the information earlier. It also denied his request to amend the complaint because he did not identify additional facts that would cure the defects and amendment at that stage would prejudice the defendants.

Judge Ronnie Abrams ordered that Chavez’s motion to preclude evidence be denied and the defendants’ motion for summary judgment be granted in part and denied in part. The court directed the clerk to terminate Tortorice from the docket, referred the case for a settlement conference, and deferred ruling on Chavez’s request for counsel pending that conference.