Quinn v. City of New York

Background

Francis Paul Quinn, Jr. fell while crossing an intersection between West 53rd Street and Avenue of the Americas in Manhattan on July 3, 2019. He alleged that he suffered injuries, including limited mobility in his right shoulder. His wife, Lori Ann Quinn, sought damages for loss of her husband’s services, companionship, and consortium.

The Quinns first sued Consolidated Edison, Inc. in federal court. They alleged that Quinn fell because his foot caught in a hole near a raised Consolidated Edison gas cap. During that case, Quinn testified that his foot went into a hole and twisted against the raised gas cap. After a mediation at which Magistrate Judge Aaron proposed a settlement of $2,499,000, the parties accepted the proposal, and the Quinns released Consolidated Edison from claims arising from the July 3, 2019 incident.

The Quinns later sued the City of New York and the New York City Department of Transportation. In the present case, they alleged that Quinn fell because of a pothole or other hazardous condition in the crosswalk caused by the City defendants’ negligence in maintaining and controlling it. The City defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which permits dismissal when a complaint does not adequately state a legal claim, and based on judicial estoppel.

Judicial estoppel

Judicial estoppel is a rule that prevents a party from taking clearly conflicting positions in different legal proceedings after successfully relying on the earlier position, particularly when changing positions would create an unfair advantage or harm another party. The court concluded that all three relevant factors were satisfied.

First, the court found a clear inconsistency. In the Consolidated Edison case, the Quinns attributed the fall to the gas cap and the area within twelve inches of it. In this case, they attributed the fall to a pothole or condition for which the City defendants were responsible. The court explained that under the cited New York transportation rule, the owner of a street cover or grating is responsible for the cover and the area extending twelve inches around it. Thus, the theories placed responsibility on different parties and could not both describe the location and cause of the fall.

Second, the court found that the earlier position had been accepted for judicial-estoppel purposes. Although settlements ordinarily do not establish that a court accepted a party’s position, the court treated this settlement differently because Magistrate Judge Aaron proposed it after reviewing extensive materials and the settlement reflected his assessment of the parties’ arguments.

Third, the court found that allowing the present case to proceed would give the Quinns an unfair advantage and impose unfair burdens on the City defendants and Consolidated Edison. The Quinns had already received a substantial settlement and had released Consolidated Edison, yet the City defendants had brought a third-party claim against Consolidated Edison concerning the same accident. The court also found that the Quinns had concealed or misstated aspects of the earlier lawsuit, the notice of claim against the City, and related testimony and disclosures.

Ruling and other orders

The court held that the Quinns’ claim was barred by judicial estoppel and granted the City defendants’ motion to dismiss. It dismissed the complaint in its entirety with prejudice. Because it ruled for the City defendants on judicial estoppel, the court did not decide the City defendants’ separate argument that the New York City Department of Transportation was not a suable entity.

The court also ordered the Quinns’ counsel to show cause—meaning to explain why sanctions should not be imposed—under Rule 11(c)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and potentially under New York professional-conduct rules. The court directed counsel to file that submission within 30 days after entry of the order and directed the Clerk to terminate the open motions.