Wiener v. Axa Equitable Life Ins Co

Background

Malcolm H. Wiener sued AXA Equitable Life Insurance Co., David Hungerford, AXA Advisors, L.L.C., and AXA Network, L.L.C. He alleged that his three flexible-premium life insurance policies lapsed after required payments were not made and that AXA Equitable failed to reinstate the policies. His claims included contract, negligence, fiduciary-duty, fraudulent-misrepresentation, waiver, and Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act claims.

The court had previously excluded testimony from two of Wiener’s proposed experts, granted summary judgment to the defendants on all claims, and denied Wiener’s cross-motion for partial summary judgment. Summary judgment is a decision made without a trial when the court determines that the available evidence does not present a legally sufficient dispute requiring a trial.

Wiener then moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) to alter or amend the judgment. That rule provides a limited procedure for asking a court to change a judgment based on an intervening change in controlling law, genuinely new evidence, or a need to correct clear error or prevent serious injustice.

Arguments About Evidence from the Earlier Related Proceeding

Wiener argued that Hallie Hodgins’s testimony in an earlier related proceeding contradicted her deposition testimony in this case about whether she contacted, or believed she was authorized to contact, Dr. Barry Boyd. He argued that the contradiction affected Hodgins’s credibility and whether AXA Equitable’s refusal to reinstate his policies was arbitrary and capricious. He also relied on differing discovery responses about the number of medical codes reported to the Medical Information Bureau.

The court held that this material did not satisfy the strict standard for newly discovered evidence. Wiener knew about Hodgins’s testimony by September 2020, before the court entered summary judgment, so he was not justifiably unaware of it. The court also held that the evidence would not have changed the result because it was immaterial to the issues decided and was cumulative or merely impeaching. The court noted that its summary-judgment decision did not depend on Hodgins’s credibility and that the reasonableness of AXA Equitable’s underwriting decision was not challenged with admissible, material evidence.

Challenges to AXA Equitable’s Expert

Wiener argued that the court should not have considered testimony from AXA Equitable’s expert, Vera Dolan. He challenged the foundation for her qualifications, her credibility, and the methodology behind the evidence supporting AXA Equitable’s underwriting guidelines. He also renewed his argument that the company’s reliance on certain medical information for applicants over age 70 constituted age discrimination.

The court rejected these arguments. It held that Wiener was raising new arguments about Dolan’s credibility that were not proper subjects of a Rule 59(e) motion. It also concluded that those arguments were not material because the earlier summary-judgment decision rested on Wiener’s failure to provide admissible evidence challenging the reasonableness of AXA Equitable’s reliance on its underwriting information and guidelines.

Premium Notices, Deadlines, and Waiver

Wiener argued that the court had incorrectly granted summary judgment on claims involving November 2013 premium reminder notices, alleged failures to send policy-lapse notices, and fraudulent misrepresentation. He also argued that AXA Equitable had waived enforcement of the payment deadlines through its prior dealings with him.

The court held that these arguments either repeated issues already decided or relied on evidence and legal theories that Wiener had previously had an opportunity to present. It again rejected the waiver argument and relied on its earlier conclusion that, as a matter of law, AXA Equitable had not waived its right to terminate the policies on December 2, 2013.

Request to Amend the Complaint

Wiener also sought leave to add claims under New York’s General Business Law and Insurance Law. The court denied that application. It explained that, after judgment has been entered, a party seeking to amend must first obtain relief from the judgment under Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b). Because the court did not vacate its prior judgment, it denied leave to amend.

Disposition and Classification

The court denied Wiener’s motion for reconsideration and denied his request for leave to amend. The order left in place the earlier judgment granting summary judgment to the defendants. This opinion is classified as a procedural order because it addressed a request to reconsider an earlier ruling rather than deciding the underlying insurance claims anew.