Bristol v. Securitas Security Services USA, Inc.

Background

Jessica Bristol brought employment-discrimination claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the New York State Human Rights Law, and the New York City Human Rights Law. She alleged that Securitas discriminated against her because of her pregnancy and disability. According to the complaint, after a surgical procedure during a high-risk pregnancy, her physicians advised her not to stand for long periods. Bristol alleged that Securitas could have assigned her to restrictive desk duty but instead often required her to stand, and that this failure contributed to harm during her pregnancy.

Bristol began working for Securitas in April 2016. During onboarding, she signed an acknowledgment stating that she had received, read, and understood Securitas’s Dispute Resolution Agreement and that employment or continued employment constituted acceptance of its terms. The agreement required both the employee and the company to resolve covered disputes through final and binding arbitration rather than in court. It applied to all disputes regarding the employment relationship and was governed by the Federal Arbitration Act.

Arguments and analysis

Securitas moved to compel arbitration. Bristol did not dispute that her claims fell within the agreement’s scope, that her federal statutory claims could be arbitrated, or that the case should be stayed if arbitration was required. She instead argued that the agreement was too indefinite to enforce because it did not specify certain details, including the arbitration location, forum, arbitrator, procedural rules, and choice of law. She also argued that she had not knowingly and voluntarily waived her right to a jury trial.

The court applied New York contract-law principles to determine whether the parties agreed to arbitrate. It concluded that the agreement was sufficiently definite. Although the agreement called for the parties to try to agree on an arbitrator, it also provided that either party could ask a court to appoint one if they could not agree. The agreement further limited the arbitration location to no more than 45 miles from the place where Bristol last worked, unless both parties agreed otherwise in writing. The court determined that the remaining procedural details were not essential terms that had to be specified for the agreement to be enforceable.

The court also rejected Bristol’s proposed test for determining whether she knowingly and voluntarily waived a jury trial. That test applied to stand-alone jury-waiver clauses, while the jury-trial waiver here was part of the arbitration agreement. Because all of Bristol’s claims were subject to arbitration and Securitas requested a stay, the court concluded that the case had to be stayed pending arbitration.

Ruling

The court granted Securitas’s motion to compel arbitration. It stayed the action pending the conclusion of arbitration and directed the parties to report to the court within 14 days after arbitration concluded. Securitas also asked for sanctions against Bristol’s attorney under federal law and the court’s inherent authority, alleging bad faith. Judge Gabriel W. Gorenstein found no basis for sanctions because the record did not establish bad faith by clear and convincing evidence.