Hutchinson v. City of New York
- Alvin Hellerstein
- 1:19-cv-00270
- U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
- 11
In Hutchinson v. City of New York, Judge Hellerstein denied Hutchinson’s requests for judgment as a matter of law or a new trial.
Kevin Hutchinson and the defendants—Brendan Grace, Mandeep Singh, and the City of New York. The jury’s verdict for the defendants remained in place.
What happened
In Hutchinson v. City of New York, a jury found for the defendants on Kevin Hutchinson’s claims involving his arrest, force used against him, prosecution, fair-trial rights, and strip search. The court had entered judgment for the defendants.
Hutchinson asked the court to enter judgment in his favor on the strip-search claim or order a new trial on all his claims. He argued that the evidence did not support the verdict, that the officers’ testimony was not credible, and that the jury instructions on probable cause for his malicious-prosecution claim were legally wrong.
Judge Hellerstein denied the motion. He ruled that Hutchinson had not preserved his request for judgment as a matter of law before the case went to the jury and had not shown a manifest injustice. He also found no sufficient basis to disturb the jury’s credibility decisions or order a new trial on the malicious-prosecution claim.
The detailed version
- Hutchinson v. City of New York · No. 1:19-cv-00270
- Alvin Hellerstein
- Apr. 19, 2022
Background
Kevin Hutchinson sued New York Police Officers Brendan Grace and Mandeep Singh, individually, and the City of New York. He alleged constitutional and state-law violations involving false arrest, excessive force, malicious prosecution, denial of a fair trial, and an unlawful strip search. The case went to trial in December 2021, and the jury returned a verdict for the defendants on every claim. The court entered judgment on January 5, 2022.
Hutchinson moved for judgment as a matter of law under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b) on his unlawful strip-search claim, also described in the opinion as a cavity-search claim. He alternatively moved under Rule 59(a) for a new trial on all of his claims. Hutchinson did not have the trial transcript, citing financial constraints, but the court considered his arguments in the interest of justice.
Judgment as a Matter of Law
The court denied Hutchinson’s Rule 50(b) motion. A renewed request for judgment as a matter of law generally requires the party to have first made a similar motion under Rule 50(a) before the case was submitted to the jury. Hutchinson had not made that earlier motion. Because of that failure, he had to show that relief was necessary to prevent a manifest injustice—meaning that the verdict was wholly without legal support.
The court found that Hutchinson had not met that standard. Although a police log stated that Officer Grace conducted the search, Hutchinson had not identified Grace at trial as the officer who performed it. The court also noted that Hutchinson’s earlier description of the officer did not match Grace. The jury was entitled to consider this conflicting evidence, credit the defendants’ testimony, and decide which account was more credible. The court therefore denied judgment as a matter of law.
Request for a New Trial on the Other Claims
The court also denied Hutchinson’s Rule 59(a) request for a new trial on his false-arrest, excessive-force, malicious-prosecution, and fair-trial claims. A court may grant a new trial when a verdict is seriously erroneous or amounts to a miscarriage of justice, but the court should rarely overturn a jury’s assessment of witness credibility.
Hutchinson argued that his testimony and evidence were credible while the officers’ testimony was materially inconsistent. The court explained that the jury heard testimony and documentary evidence from both sides, including Hutchinson’s testimony, testimony from Diamondique Richardson, police records, charging documents, maps, and photographs. The court found that the jury’s decision to credit the defendants’ version did not make the verdict seriously erroneous or egregious.
Malicious-Prosecution Instruction
Hutchinson separately sought a new trial on his malicious-prosecution claim under Posr v. Doherty, arguing that the jury should have separately determined whether probable cause existed for each crime for which he was prosecuted.
The court rejected that argument. It said its instructions did not tell the jury that probable cause for one charge automatically established probable cause for every charge. Instead, the instructions required the jury to consider whether there was a lack of probable cause supporting all the crimes for which Hutchinson was prosecuted. The court also found that the charges arose from the same facts, unlike the distinct encounters involved in Posr.
The court further explained that Hutchinson had been indicted by a grand jury, creating a rebuttable presumption that probable cause existed. To overcome that presumption, he had to show that the indictment resulted from fraud, perjury, suppression of evidence, other bad-faith conduct, or a malicious initiation of the prosecution. The court found that he had not made that showing and denied a new trial on the malicious-prosecution claim.
Disposition
The court denied the motion for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(b) and denied the motion for a new trial under Rule 59(a). The Clerk of Court was directed to terminate the motion at ECF No. 64.
Read the full 11-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.