Kemp v. NYC Department of Health and Mental Hygiene

Background

Kecia Kemp filed an employment-discrimination complaint against the NYC Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (DoHMH), the NYC Department of Citywide Administration Services (DCAS), and the NYC Health and Hospitals Corporation (H+H). She alleged that her former employers discriminated against her based on race and sex. Her complaint invoked Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the Rehabilitation Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Family and Medical Leave Act, and New York State and New York City human-rights laws. In her amended complaint, she asserted the federal claims but did not reassert the state and city human-rights claims.

Kemp proceeded without a lawyer and filed without paying the filing fee. The court had previously directed her to amend her original complaint to provide more facts supporting each claim against each defendant and to explain why the defendants could be sued together. After reviewing the amended complaint, the court concluded that it still did not provide the required supporting facts.

Claims Against DoHMH

The court dismissed Kemp’s claims against DoHMH under claim preclusion, a rule that prevents a party from bringing a later case based on claims that were decided, or could have been decided, in an earlier case involving the same opposing party. The court reviewed Kemp’s earlier state-court and federal proceedings concerning her employment with DoHMH. It found that those proceedings involved the same events, had been decided on the merits, and barred the claims raised in this action. The court applied the doctrine even though the defendants had not raised it in an answer.

Claims Against DCAS

The court dismissed Kemp’s claims against DCAS under the federal employment-discrimination statutes for failure to state a claim. Those statutes generally require an employment relationship, including a relationship in which the defendant was the employer, a joint employer, or otherwise controlled relevant employment terms. Kemp did not allege that DCAS employed her, that she sought employment from DCAS, or that DCAS controlled her compensation or working conditions. She also did not allege facts showing that DCAS was a labor union, employment agency, joint employer, or part of an integrated enterprise with her former employer. The court noted that the attachments appeared to show DCAS decided an appeal concerning her request for reinstatement, but that did not establish an employment relationship.

Claims Against H+H

The court also dismissed Kemp’s claims against H+H. She did not allege facts showing that H+H took adverse employment action against her because of a protected characteristic. The court found that an attached H+H letter stated that her employment ended because she did not satisfactorily complete her probationary period. On that basis, the court concluded that she failed to state a claim under the federal antidiscrimination statutes.

Disposition

Because the court dismissed the claims against the defendants, it found that the question of whether the defendants were properly joined in one lawsuit was moot. Although courts generally allow a self-represented plaintiff to amend a defective complaint, the court declined to grant another opportunity because Kemp had already amended once and the defects appeared incurable.

The court dismissed the complaint as barred by claim preclusion and under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), which requires dismissal of a filing-fee-free complaint that fails to state a claim. It did not add a separate “with prejudice” or “without prejudice” designation. The court also certified under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal would not be taken in good faith and denied filing-fee-free status for an appeal.