Jones v. Westchester County Department of Corrections

Background

Steven A. Jones, Jr., who was incarcerated at Westchester County Jail, proceeded without a lawyer and without paying filing fees. He alleged that he was exposed to and contracted COVID-19 because correctional staff did not follow policies and procedures intended to contain the virus. He alleged that inmates initially lacked protective equipment, received masks infrequently, reused contaminated supplies, and were quarantined with both infected and uninfected inmates. Jones alleged that he tested positive on April 14, 2020, and suffered severe symptoms.

Jones brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal law that permits people to sue for violations of constitutional rights, alleging that Westchester County, Commissioner Joseph K. Spano, County Executive George Latimer, Wellpath, and physician Herbert Stoddard violated the Eighth Amendment. Jones also alleged that Stoddard violated his privacy by shouting his COVID-19 test results through a closed cell door. The defendants moved to dismiss, and Jones did not file opposition papers despite receiving the motion papers and additional notices from the court.

COVID-19 and Eighth Amendment claims

The court analyzed the Eighth Amendment claim under the deliberate-indifference standard. Jones had to allege both that the jail conditions created a substantial risk of serious harm and that the defendants knew of and disregarded that risk by failing to take reasonable protective measures.

The court held that the amended complaint did not plausibly satisfy either part of that test. It stated that the complaint itself described measures at the jail, including social distancing, hand-cleaning, hand sanitizer, frequent surface cleaning, guidance about avoiding high-touch surfaces, and masks. The court also treated the quarantine procedure for people suspected of having COVID-19 as a measure intended to reduce transmission. In light of those measures, the court held that the allegations did not plausibly show that Jones faced a substantial risk of serious harm caused by the jail’s conditions.

The court separately held that Jones did not adequately allege the required state of mind. Even if the jail’s response had been imperfect or negligent, the court stated, negligence was not enough to establish deliberate indifference. Jones also failed to allege personal involvement by Spano and Latimer; their supervisory positions alone did not establish that they participated in or were responsible for the alleged constitutional violations.

As to Westchester County and Wellpath, the court explained that liability under § 1983 requires allegations that a policy, custom, or practice of the municipality or private business caused the constitutional violation. The court found that Jones had not adequately alleged such a policy, custom, or widespread practice. Instead, his allegations claimed that officials failed to follow a policy, which the court held did not state this type of claim.

Claims concerning Stoddard and medical privacy

The court considered the claim that Stoddard disclosed Jones’s COVID-19 test result. To the extent Jones relied on the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, the court held that this federal statute does not allow a private lawsuit by a patient. The court also dismissed any Eighth Amendment claim against Stoddard for the reasons stated in its analysis of the other defendants’ conduct.

The court noted that Jones did not expressly invoke the Fourteenth Amendment. It nevertheless stated that any Fourteenth Amendment privacy claim based on disclosure of the COVID-19 result would also fail. The court explained that an incarcerated person’s medical-information privacy is not absolute and that disclosure related to protecting jail staff and inmates from COVID-19 could serve a legitimate prison-related interest.

The opinion states that Stoddard had not been served and that Wellpath reported Stoddard had died. The court nevertheless considered whether federal claims against him could proceed under the statute requiring screening of claims brought without prepayment of filing fees.

State-law claims and disposition

After dismissing the federal claims, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, meaning authority over related state-law claims, to the extent Jones intended to assert any state-law claims. The court expressly stated that it did not reach the defendants’ substantive arguments for dismissing those claims.

The court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss and dismissed Jones’s claims against them. It dismissed Stoddard under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). The court later stated that the claims in the amended complaint were dismissed with prejudice because Jones had already received an opportunity to amend and further amendment would be futile. It closed the case and certified that an appeal would not be taken in good faith, denying permission to proceed without paying fees for an appeal.