Evans v. Samaritan Daytop Village
- John Cronan
- 1:21-cv-08660
- U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
- 2
In Evans v. Samaritan Daytop Village, Judge Cronan treated a magistrate judge’s denial of default judgment as a recommendation and set an objection deadline.
Jeniere K. Evans and Samaritan Daytop Village, Inc.; the order establishes how both parties may object to the recommendation concerning default judgment.
What happened
In Evans v. Samaritan Daytop Village, Inc., Jeniere K. Evans asked for default judgment because Samaritan Daytop Village filed its answer ten days late. Evans was representing herself.
Judge Barbara C. Moses denied the request, finding that the late filing was at most negligent, was corrected promptly, and caused no identifiable prejudice. Samaritan Daytop Village opposed default judgment, arguing that its delay was not willful, that it had strong defenses, and that Evans was not prejudiced.
Judge John P. Cronan treated Judge Moses’s decision as a formal recommendation because default judgment could end the case. He allowed the parties fourteen days after service to file written objections and explained that missing the deadline would waive objections for purposes of an appeal.
The detailed version
- Evans v. Samaritan Daytop Village · No. 1:21-cv-08660
- John Cronan
- May 2, 2022
Background
Jeniere K. Evans, proceeding without a lawyer, asked the Court for default judgment against Samaritan Daytop Village, Inc. She based the request on the defendant’s filing its answer ten days late.
The defendant opposed the request. It argued that its default was not willful, that it had meritorious defenses to Evans’s claims, and that Evans could not show prejudice from the ten-day delay.
Earlier ruling
Judge Barbara C. Moses, who was handling general pretrial supervision, treated Evans’s affidavit as a motion for default judgment. In an Initial Case Management Order, Judge Moses denied the motion. She found that the defendant’s error was at most negligent, was promptly corrected before Evans sought default, and caused Evans no identifiable prejudice.
Judge Cronan’s order
Because default judgment is a dispositive matter—one that can resolve the case or a claim—the Court treated Judge Moses’s order as a report and recommendation rather than as a final ruling by the magistrate judge. The order did not state that Judge Cronan adopted or rejected the recommendation. Instead, it set the procedure for objections.
The parties had fourteen days after service of Judge Moses’s order to file written objections. A party could respond to the other party’s objections within fourteen days after receiving them. The order required objections to be filed with the Clerk of Court, with courtesy copies sent to Judge Cronan’s chambers and the opposing party. It also stated that failing to file timely objections would waive those objections for purposes of an appeal. Requests for more time had to be addressed to Judge Cronan.
Disposition
The opinion sets an objection process for the report and recommendation concerning Evans’s default-judgment motion. It does not report a final ruling by Judge Cronan on whether default judgment would be entered.
Read the full 2-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.