Badamo v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc.

Background

Sebastian P. Badamo, executor for the estate of Carlo G. Badamo, brought a survival claim under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30104. The claim alleges that Carlo developed asbestos-related lung cancer because of negligence by Chevron U.S.A. Inc., Chiquita Brands International, Inc., Farrell Lines, Inc., and National Bulk Carriers, Inc. National Bulk Carriers was later dismissed from the action without prejudice. Farrell Lines, Chiquita, and Chevron each moved for summary judgment.

Carlo worked in the merchant marines from 1944 to 1955 and served on four Chevron vessels. The parties disputed whether he served on those vessels for 87 or 89 days. Carlo testified generally that engine-room workers were exposed to asbestos and described asbestos dust, insulation, gaskets, and repair work. He did not give testimony specifically identifying asbestos exposure on each Chevron vessel. His sworn declaration identified the four vessels and stated that asbestos-containing products were used aboard them and that he breathed dust from those products. Plaintiff’s experts also offered evidence about asbestos use on merchant vessels, the presence of asbestos in engine-room equipment, and the connection between Carlo’s asbestos exposure and lung cancer.

Statute of limitations

The defendants argued that the Jones Act’s three-year limitations period began before July 29, 2017, more than three years before the lawsuit was filed on July 28, 2020. They relied on a July 17 chest X-ray showing a lung mass, a July 21 computed-tomography scan describing a mass highly suspicious for lung cancer, and a July 26 medical visit describing the mass as highly suggestive of advanced lung cancer. Chevron also argued that Carlo’s 2008 asbestos-related lawsuit showed that he already knew enough to sue.

The court applied the discovery rule for gradual injuries. Under that rule, a Jones Act claim accrues when the plaintiff knows, or reasonably should know, both that an injury exists and what caused it. The court held that the question whether Carlo should have known that he had lung cancer before July 29, 2017 was for a factfinder, not something the court could decide as a matter of law. The records described suspected cancer and called for additional testing, and Carlo was not definitively diagnosed until after the August 2, 2017 biopsy. The court also applied the separate-diseases rule, under which the limitations period for one asbestos-related disease does not necessarily begin the limitations period for a different disease. Because this lawsuit specifically alleged lung cancer, the 2008 lawsuit concerning other asbestos-related injuries did not establish that the lung-cancer claim was untimely.

Evidence concerning Chevron

Chevron argued that Plaintiff lacked evidence showing that Carlo was exposed to asbestos on any of the four Chevron vessels. The court explained that Jones Act causation has a relaxed standard: the plaintiff need show only that the employer’s negligence played any part, even a slight part, in causing the injury. Circumstantial evidence may be sufficient, and the jury’s role in deciding fault and causation must be viewed broadly.

Viewing the evidence in Plaintiff’s favor, the court found enough for a reasonable jury to conclude that Carlo was exposed to asbestos on Chevron’s vessels. The evidence included his work as a fireman, water-tender, and oiler in engine rooms; his testimony about asbestos exposure in those positions; his sworn declaration; evidence that steam lines and engine-room equipment were insulated with asbestos; Coast Guard materials concerning asbestos on vessels built during the relevant period; and expert testimony about asbestos exposure aboard merchant vessels. The court stated that the evidence, considered as a whole, could support at least a circumstantial case. Chevron’s arguments about the limited number of days Carlo served on its vessels, his lack of asbestos-identification training, and the absence of vessel-specific testimony concerned the weight of the evidence rather than whether the evidence was legally sufficient to reach a jury.

Disposition

The court denied Farrell Lines’ motion for summary judgment, denied Chiquita’s motion for summary judgment, and denied Chevron’s motion for summary judgment. The conclusion states that the motions for summary judgment are denied. The Clerk of Court was directed to close docket entries 80, 92, and 96.