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S.D.N.Y.Procedural orderFiled June 1, 2022

Gamble v. Fieldston Lodge Nursing and Rehabilitation Center

Judge
Laura Swain
Docket
1:20-cv-10388
Court
U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
Pages
9
EmploymentCivil ProcedureMotion to Dismiss
In one sentence

In Gamble v. Fieldston, Judge Swain granted Fieldston’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, dismissing Gamble’s Title VII hostile-work-environment claim.

Who this affects

Tanya Gamble’s Title VII hostile-work-environment claim was dismissed. The opinion states that Fieldston’s motion did not seek judgment on Gamble’s separate discrimination and retaliation claims.

What happened

In Gamble v. Fieldston Lodge Nursing and Rehabilitation Center, Tanya Gamble alleged that Fieldston employees made offensive comments and jokes about her sexual orientation after a video of her engagement circulated at work. She also alleged that Fieldston failed to respond adequately to her complaints and that she later faced retaliation.

Fieldston asked the court to rule on the pleadings against Gamble’s Title VII hostile-work-environment claim. The court held that the alleged conduct, considered together, was not severe or frequent enough to create a legally hostile workplace, and the complaint did not adequately allege that Gamble experienced the workplace as hostile or abusive.

Judge Laura Swain granted Fieldston’s motion and dismissed Count III, the hostile-work-environment claim. The motion did not seek judgment on Gamble’s separate discrimination and retaliation claims, and the court directed the parties to report on discovery and any planned motions for summary judgment.

The detailed version

For law students, journalists, and other readers who want the full reasoning

Case
Gamble v. Fieldston Lodge Nursing and Rehabilitation Center · No. 1:20-cv-10388
Judge
Laura Swain
Date
June 1, 2022

Background

Tanya Gamble alleged that she was employed by Fieldston Lodge Nursing and Rehabilitation Center from 2013 until August 13, 2019. She asserted claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for sexual-orientation discrimination, retaliation, and a hostile work environment. The claims arose from her employment with Fieldston. Fieldston moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) for judgment on the pleadings on Count III, the hostile-work-environment claim. The opinion states that Fieldston did not seek judgment on Count I, the discrimination claim, or Count II, the retaliation claim.

Gamble alleged that a video of her engagement to her same-sex partner circulated at her workplace in May 2019. She alleged that coworkers made comments about her sexual orientation, including asking whether she would attend a New York City LGBTQ Pride parade and telling her, “You don’t look gay.” She also alleged that coworkers made gestures and comments about another employee believed to be homosexual, and that administrator Knolls used an anti-gay slur when referring to gay men. After Gamble complained to three people at Fieldston, she alleged that Knolls largely stopped speaking to her, Fieldston withdrew an offer for her to become Staffing Coordinator, and Fieldston terminated her employment.

Legal standard and analysis

A Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings uses the same standard as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The court accepts nonconclusory factual allegations as true and asks whether the complaint contains enough factual matter to make the claim plausible. For a Title VII hostile-work-environment claim, the complaint must allege conduct that was objectively severe or pervasive, that Gamble subjectively viewed as hostile or abusive, and that occurred because of her sexual orientation.

The court concluded that the complaint did not plausibly allege an objectively severe or pervasive hostile work environment. It described the comments directed at Gamble as insensitive and offensive but found that the few specific examples over the relevant four-month period did not change the conditions of her employment. The comments about another employee were not directed at Gamble and were few in number. The court also found that the responses from the people Gamble contacted about her complaints were insufficient, by themselves or together with the other allegations, to establish a hostile work environment.

The court considered the allegations concerning Knolls but found them insufficient without more detail. The allegation that Knolls almost completely stopped speaking to Gamble did not explain the regularity or volume of their prior contact. The allegation that Knolls used an anti-gay slur did not say that Gamble was present, who heard it, or when and how Gamble learned about it. The court also noted that the complaint did not allege that the comments were threatening or humiliating, rather than merely offensive, or that they interfered with Gamble’s work performance. Finally, the court found that Gamble’s three complaints on one day and her general allegation of emotional distress did not plausibly show that she subjectively experienced her work environment as hostile or abusive.

Disposition

The court held that Gamble’s complaint did not plausibly allege a Title VII hostile-work-environment claim and dismissed that claim. Judge Laura Taylor Swain granted Fieldston’s motion for judgment on the pleadings as to Count III. The order did not rule on Counts I or II. The parties were directed to file a joint letter about completing discovery and whether either side intended to seek summary judgment.

The authoritative version

Read the full 9-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.

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