Jones v. New York City

Background

Jonathan A. Jones, proceeding without a lawyer, brought the action under the court’s federal-question jurisdiction and had previously been allowed to proceed without prepaying filing fees. The complaint named New York City, “HASA Steven,” and Jay Shaqwan Williams. The court described the complaint as largely illegible and said it provided few facts. Jones alleged that he was sexually abused, that his “ex” was trying to kill him, that he was living on the street, and that something unclear was in his eye. He alleged injuries to his feet, penis, eyes, and heart and sought millions of dollars in damages.

Screening standards

Because Jones was proceeding without a lawyer and without prepaying fees, the court reviewed the complaint under the federal law requiring dismissal of claims that are frivolous, malicious, legally insufficient, or seek money from an immune defendant. The court also had to dismiss claims over which it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. Although courts read self-represented complaints generously, the complaint still must give a short and plain statement of facts showing a plausible right to relief.

Claims against the individual defendants

The court treated Jones’s constitutional-rights allegations as claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Such a claim requires allegations that a constitutional or federal-law right was violated by a person acting under state law. It also requires facts showing each defendant’s direct personal involvement.

Jones did not provide facts explaining who “HASA Steven” was or what that person did. The court stated that, if this defendant was an employee of New York City’s HIV/AIDS Services Administration, the person might be a state actor, but Jones still had not alleged personal involvement. The court likewise said it was unclear who Jay Shaqwan Williams was or why Williams was named. If Williams was not a municipal employee or another state actor, Jones could not state a § 1983 claim against Williams.

Claim against New York City

A municipality is not liable under § 1983 merely because one of its employees or agents allegedly acted wrongfully. A plaintiff must allege a municipal policy, custom, or practice that caused the constitutional violation. The court found that Jones’s complaint contained no facts suggesting that a New York City policy, custom, or practice caused a violation of his federally protected rights. It granted Jones leave to add facts supporting a claim against the City.

Timeliness

The court also found that Jones’s claims appeared to be barred by the three-year limitations period applicable to § 1983 personal-injury claims in New York. Jones alleged that the relevant events occurred in either 2013 or 2015, but the complaint was filed on May 20, 2022. The court explained that certain circumstances can pause the limitations period, including specific forms of concealment, disability, or other circumstances recognized by law. Jones had not provided facts suggesting that pausing the limitations period was justified. The court granted leave to amend so he could address the apparent untimeliness.

Leave to amend and disposition

Because it was not clear that amendment would be futile, Judge Laura Taylor Swain granted Jones 60 days to file an amended complaint. The amended complaint had to replace, rather than supplement, the original complaint and repeat any facts or claims Jones wanted the court to consider. The court directed him to identify the relevant people and their roles, describe what each defendant did or failed to do, provide approximate dates and locations, describe his injuries, and state the relief sought.

The order did not dismiss the federal claims at that time. It stated that, if Jones failed to file a compliant amended complaint within the allowed period and could not show good cause, the federal § 1983 claims would be dismissed for failure to state a claim, and the court would decline supplemental jurisdiction over any state-law claims. No summons would issue at that time. The court also certified that an appeal would not be taken in good faith and denied fee-free status for purposes of an appeal.