Navedo v. Social Security

Background

Amber Marie Navedo sought judicial review of the Social Security Administration’s final decision denying her applications for Social Security Disability Insurance benefits and Supplemental Security Income. She alleged that she had been disabled since July 21, 2017. After a hearing, Administrative Law Judge Ryan Alger found that Navedo was not disabled from July 21, 2017, through November 29, 2019.

The administrative law judge found that Navedo had severe impairments including major depression, anxiety, post-traumatic stress disorder, scoliosis, and obesity. He found moderate limitations in four areas of mental functioning and determined that she could perform medium work with restrictions: she could carry out and remember simple instructions, interact occasionally with coworkers, and could not interact with the public. Based on testimony from a vocational expert, he found that she could work as a dishwasher, janitor, or cook.

Navedo and the Commissioner filed competing motions for judgment on the pleadings, asking the court to rule based on the existing administrative record.

Court’s Analysis

The court held that the administrative law judge failed to properly evaluate the medical opinions of treating therapist Judith McAllister, psychiatric nurse practitioner Luca Radomile, and Dr. Azariah Eshkenazi. Under the regulations governing Navedo’s claim, the administrative law judge had to explain how well each opinion was supported by the source’s own findings and how consistent it was with the entire record.

The court found that the administrative law judge did not adequately address the supporting findings identified by these providers, including depression, irritability, difficulty concentrating, poor memory, social withdrawal, sleep problems, abnormal affect, and other symptoms. The court also found that the administrative law judge relied on selected treatment notes and mental-status findings without considering Navedo’s reported symptoms throughout the record. In addition, he did not address the consistency among the three providers’ opinions, including their opinions that Navedo would likely be absent from work more than three times per month.

The court separately found that the residual functional capacity assessment—the finding about the work Navedo could still perform—was not supported by substantial evidence. The administrative law judge characterized some examination results as generally normal while failing to adequately address abnormal findings documented by examining providers. The court also found no sufficient explanation for why the residual functional capacity allowed occasional contact with coworkers but no contact with the public, even though the consultative examiner described limitations involving both groups.

The errors were not harmless. The court explained that crediting the medical opinions could have affected whether Navedo met the mental-impairment requirements for disability or whether any jobs remained available. The vocational expert had testified that three or more absences per month would eliminate all competitive employment.

Disposition

The court granted Navedo’s motion, denied the Commissioner’s cross-motion, and remanded the case pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for further proceedings. The court did not decide that Navedo was disabled or direct the Commissioner to award benefits. Judge James L. Cott issued the order.