Molina v. Saul

Background

Patricia Molina sought judicial review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) of the Social Security Administration’s final decision denying her applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income. Molina alleged that she was disabled during a closed period from July 17, 2013, through March 11, 2018, because of back injuries and related physical and mental impairments.

After several administrative proceedings, Administrative Law Judge Vincent M. Cascio found that Molina was not disabled during the relevant period. The judge found severe impairments including bilateral sacroiliitis, lumbar myositis or myofascial pain syndrome, spondylosis of L5-S1, major depressive disorder, and anxiety disorder. The judge determined that Molina could perform less than the full range of sedentary work, including sitting for up to six hours in an eight-hour workday, and concluded that she could perform jobs such as polisher, inspector, and labeler.

The parties filed competing motions for judgment on the pleadings, asking the court to decide the case based on the pleadings and administrative record.

Issues and Analysis

Molina argued that the administrative law judge improperly rejected the opinions of treating physicians Dr. Robert L. Hecht and Dr. Paul Brisson, particularly their opinions that Molina had significant limits on sitting. Dr. Hecht opined that Molina could sit only occasionally, and Dr. Brisson opined that she could sit for two hours during an eight-hour workday. Molina also argued that the judge improperly evaluated her statements about her symptoms.

The court held that the administrative law judge violated the treating-physician rule. For claims filed before March 27, 2017, that rule generally required an administrative law judge to give controlling or greater weight to a treating physician’s opinion when supported by medically acceptable evidence and not inconsistent with the record, or to provide good reasons for assigning it less weight. The court explained that the judge did not adequately consider the physicians’ treatment relationships with Molina, Dr. Brisson’s specialty in orthopedic spinal surgery, or the consistency between the physicians’ opinions about Molina’s ability to sit.

The court also rejected the reasons the administrative law judge gave for discounting the treating physicians’ opinions. The judge improperly relied on the absence of certain symptoms, conservative treatment, the lack of treatment records after November 2016, and Molina’s daily activities. The court explained that those facts did not, without more, provide good reasons to reject the treating physicians’ opinions. In particular, ordinary activities such as personal care, cleaning, preparing meals, traveling independently, attending church, and shopping did not establish that Molina could sustain sedentary work for a full workday.

The court further held that the administrative law judge did not adequately justify giving more weight to the opinions of Dr. Frank D. Oliveto and Dr. Laurence Schulman, who each examined Molina once for workers’ compensation purposes. Those doctors did not specifically address Molina’s exertional limits, including her ability to sit, and the administrative law judge did not identify evidence supporting their opinions over those of Molina’s treating physicians.

The court also found that the residual functional capacity determination was not supported by substantial evidence. No medical opinion supported the conclusion that Molina could sit for up to six hours per workday. The court concluded that the administrative law judge improperly filled that evidentiary gap with his own interpretation of the medical evidence.

The court did not decide Molina’s separate challenge to the evaluation of her statements about her symptoms. Because the case was being remanded for the treating-physician-rule errors, the court left that issue for further proceedings and stated that the administrative law judge should reevaluate Molina’s credibility on remand.

Disposition

The court held that the errors were not harmless because properly crediting the treating physicians’ sitting limitations could have changed the disability determination. The vocational expert had testified that a person limited to sitting for two hours in an eight-hour workday could not perform Molina’s past work and could not perform any other work identified in the national economy.

Molina’s motion for judgment on the pleadings was granted. The Commissioner’s cross-motion for judgment on the pleadings was denied. The case was remanded pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for further proceedings. The court did not award benefits or determine that Molina was disabled.