Commey v. De Blasio

Background

Aaron Commey, proceeding without a lawyer, sued Eric Adams in his official capacity as Mayor of the City of New York and Dave A. Chokshi in his official capacity as Commissioner of the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene. He challenged two COVID-19 vaccination orders.

The first, known as “Key to NYC,” required patrons to show proof of vaccination and identification to enter certain indoor entertainment, food-service, fitness, and event venues. The order expired on March 7, 2022, and was not renewed. Commey alleged that it prevented him from going to certain restaurants, movie theaters, a gym, and some political events.

The second, the Commissioner of Health Order, required covered private employers with more than one worker in New York City to exclude workers who had not provided proof of vaccination or who had been denied a reasonable medical or religious accommodation. The order included exceptions for certain remote workers and limited workplace visits. Commey alleged that the order placed him on leave from his porter job, causing him to lose access to health, dental, and life insurance and leaving him without a reliable source of income.

Commey asserted First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment claims. He moved for a preliminary injunction, which is a court order issued before final judgment to prevent or require certain conduct. The defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint.

Court’s Analysis

The court dismissed Commey’s challenges to Key to NYC as moot. A claim is moot when the court can no longer provide effective relief. Because the order had expired and had not been renewed, the court could not enjoin it. The court also concluded that no exception to mootness applied, including exceptions for conduct that might recur or for conduct voluntarily stopped by the government.

The court separately considered the challenges to the Commissioner of Health Order under the standard for a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. At that stage, the court accepted well-pleaded factual allegations as true but did not accept conclusory statements without supporting facts.

The court rejected Commey’s substantive due process claim. It explained that the Constitution provides some protection for choosing a private occupation, but that protection does not prevent reasonable regulation and generally is not violated unless the government completely bars a person from practicing the chosen profession. The workplace order did not completely prevent Commey from working as a porter: he could seek such work outside New York City, or work in New York City if he satisfied the vaccination condition.

The court also held that a vaccination requirement imposed for public-health purposes was not unconstitutional merely because it affected employment. Applying the framework associated with Jacobson v. Massachusetts, the court concluded that the workplace order had a real or substantial relationship to the COVID-19 crisis. The Commissioner had found that workplace transmission risks were increased by close proximity and shared facilities, and that employer vaccination policies could protect public health and safety. The order also allowed medical and religious accommodations and did not apply to certain remote work.

The court rejected Commey’s argument that the order was irrational because Key to NYC had expired. It reasoned that the City could rationally distinguish workers, who might have sustained and close contact with others, from patrons. The court also stated that the order survived rational-basis review, meaning the requirement was rationally related to a legitimate government objective.

The court rejected the remaining constitutional claims. It held that the workplace order was legislative and generally applicable, so it was not subject to individualized notice-and-hearing requirements. It also held that the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment applies to convicted individuals and therefore did not apply to Commey’s challenge. To the extent Commey asserted a substantive due process right to refuse medical treatment or a right to bodily integrity, the court concluded that the same analysis foreclosed those claims.

Because Commey had not stated a plausible claim, he could not satisfy the requirement of showing a likelihood of success on the merits for a preliminary injunction. The court additionally noted that he had not shown irreparable harm and that the balance of equities and public interest would weigh against an injunction.

Disposition

The court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss. It denied Commey’s motion for preliminary injunctive relief. It denied leave to amend because the claims were legally insufficient and amendment would be futile. The Clerk of Court was directed to terminate the pending motions, close the case, and mail a copy of the order to Commey.