Keane v. Velarde

Background

Tara Keane, a United States citizen residing in Ireland, applied in 1998 for certificates of citizenship for her sons, Jason Daskalakis and Daniel Daskalakis, who were born in Greece. The applications were filed under Section 322 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1433, which addresses naturalization of children born abroad to United States citizens. Tara sought to rely on the physical presence in the United States of her mother, Helene Keane, because Tara did not have the physical presence required by the statute.

The agency requested additional evidence in 1999 and 2001. Helene alleged that she mailed the requested materials on September 10, 2001, but the materials did not reach the relevant agency files. The agency denied the applications in 2002 for failure to provide the requested evidence. Tara timely appealed those denials, but the appeals were not acted on for many years. The plaintiffs submitted new appeals in 2019. The agency denied Daniel’s appeal in 2019 and denied Jason’s appeal in January 2021, after both had turned eighteen.

The plaintiffs brought claims for mandamus, which is a court order compelling a government official to perform a legally required act; for violation of the Administrative Procedure Act; and for equitable estoppel, which can in some circumstances prevent a party from taking a position inconsistent with its prior conduct. They sought an order requiring the agency to issue the certificates based on the original applications. Helene Keane had previously been dismissed from the case for lack of standing, and the case had been transferred from the District of Connecticut to the Southern District of New York.

Statutory interpretation

The defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, and Rule 12(b)(6), for failure to state a legally sufficient claim. They argued that the requested relief was unavailable because Jason and Daniel were over eighteen and therefore no longer satisfied Section 1433. The plaintiffs argued that the age requirement had to be satisfied when the applications were submitted, not when the agency adjudicated them. They also argued that the court could order equitable relief despite the age change.

The court held that Section 1433 requires its conditions for naturalization to be satisfied when the agency adjudicates the application, rather than merely when the application is submitted. The court relied on the statutory text, the structure and purpose of Section 1433, and the statute’s focus on preserving the family unit. It rejected an interpretation that would allow an applicant to permanently lock in eligibility at the time of filing despite later changes in circumstances.

Because Jason and Daniel were both over eighteen when their applications were adjudicated, the court determined that neither qualified for naturalization under Section 1433. The court also noted that the complaint did not allege whether they satisfied other statutory requirements, including lawful physical presence in the United States and legal custody of the citizen parent.

Equitable relief

The court relied on INS v. Pangilinan and related Second Circuit decisions holding that courts may not confer citizenship through equitable powers when the statutory requirements for citizenship are not satisfied. The court therefore ruled that equitable relief, including the requested backdated certificates, was unavailable. It declined to follow authorities cited by the plaintiffs that involved different immigration issues or did not address Pangilinan.

Claims and disposition

The court ruled that the plaintiffs could not obtain mandamus because they had not shown a clear right to the requested relief or a plainly defined and mandatory government duty to provide it. The court stated that mandamus might have been available while Jason and Daniel were under eighteen and still met the other statutory requirements, but the plaintiffs did not seek that relief during the more than ten years when the applications were pending.

The court dismissed the equitable-estoppel claim because Pangilinan barred that form of relief when the statutory naturalization requirements were not met. The court deemed the Administrative Procedure Act claim abandoned because the plaintiffs did not defend it in their opposition papers. It further stated that the claim appeared moot because the agency had adjudicated both appeals. The court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss and directed the Clerk of Court to close the motion. The opinion did not state that the dismissal was with or without prejudice.