Morina v. Mayorkas

Background

Murat Morina was granted asylum in 1999 after arriving in the United States from what is now Kosovo. He later applied for adjustment of status to lawful permanent resident. USCIS denied that application in 2021, finding that he was inadmissible under terrorism-related provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act because of his alleged activities and material support involving the Kosovo Liberation Army and the Liberation Democratic of Kosovo. USCIS also separately concluded that adjustment should be denied as a matter of discretion.

Morina moved USCIS to reopen and reconsider the denial. USCIS denied that request in December 2021. Morina then sued under the Administrative Procedure Act, alleging that USCIS acted arbitrarily, abused its discretion, and made legal errors. He argued that the LDK and KLA were not Tier III terrorist organizations, that his conduct involved protecting himself and his family from violence, and that the denial was inconsistent with his earlier asylum grant. He also alleged that USCIS acted in retaliation after his lawyer threatened to seek a court order requiring the agency to decide the long-pending application.

Jurisdictional issue

The defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. The court focused on 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B), which limits judicial review of decisions or actions whose authority is placed in the discretion of the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security.

The court held that adjustment of status for a person previously granted asylum is discretionary under 8 U.S.C. § 1159(b). It therefore concluded that § 1252(a)(2)(B) barred review of USCIS’s ultimate discretionary decision to deny Morina’s application. The court also held that the bar covered USCIS’s related eligibility findings, including whether the LDK and KLA qualified as Tier III terrorist organizations and whether Morina provided material support or otherwise engaged in terrorist activity.

Use of Patel v. Garland

The court relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Patel v. Garland, which interpreted the jurisdictional bar broadly to cover factual findings connected to discretionary immigration relief. Judge Liman concluded that Patel applies to USCIS adjustment-of-status decisions made outside removal proceedings. He also concluded that Patel’s reasoning applies to the statute’s catchall provision covering other discretionary decisions or actions, even when the particular eligibility finding itself is not discretionary.

The court noted that the statute preserves review of constitutional claims and questions of law in a petition for review of a final removal order, but Morina’s case was brought in district court and did not involve such a petition. The court therefore concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over Morina’s claims. It also held that the Administrative Procedure Act could not provide a route around the Immigration and Nationality Act’s jurisdictional limits.

Bad-faith allegation and ruling

The court rejected Morina’s assertion that USCIS issued the denial in retaliation for his threat to seek mandamus relief. It explained that discovery into an agency’s decision-making process requires a strong preliminary showing of bad faith or improper behavior. The court found that Morina’s evidence consisted essentially of the fact that USCIS eventually denied his application, which was insufficient.

Judge Liman granted the motion to dismiss. The conclusion states that the motion to dismiss was “GRANTED” and directs the Clerk of Court to close the motion docket entry.