Hines v. EMI April Music Inc.
- James Oetken
- 1:20-cv-03535
- U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
- 7
In Hines v. W. Chappell Music Corp., Judge Oetken dismissed Hines’s unjust enrichment claim as preempted by the Copyright Act.
Ernie Hines’s unjust enrichment claim in Count VII was dismissed; the ruling addressed the motion brought by W. Chappell Music Corp. and the other named defendants.
What happened
In Hines v. W. Chappell Music Corp., Ernie Hines alleged that the defendants used parts of his song “Help Me Put Out The Flame (In My Heart)” in “Paper Chase” and “Toe 2 Toe” without permission. He added a claim saying the defendants were unfairly enriched.
The defendants asked the court to dismiss that claim because copyright law overrides state-law claims based on the unauthorized use of copyrighted works. The court found that Hines’s claim involved copyrightable material and the same unauthorized copying, performance, adaptation, or distribution alleged in his copyright claims. It also found that Hines alleged no separate factor, such as an implied license or work-for-hire arrangement, that would make the claim legally different.
Judge James Oetken granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss Count VII of the Third Amended Complaint and dismissed that count. The court directed the clerk to close the motion.
The detailed version
- Hines v. EMI April Music Inc. · No. 1:20-cv-03535
- James Oetken
- Aug. 23, 2022
Background
Ernie Hines sued W. Chappell Music Corp. and artists known as Jay-Z, Timbaland, and Ginuwine. Hines alleged that the defendants incorporated elements of his 1960s soul song “Help Me Put Out The Flame (In My Heart)” into “Paper Chase” and “Toe 2 Toe” without his permission. His original claims were brought under the Copyright Act. In the Third Amended Complaint, Hines added Count VII, a state-law claim for unjust enrichment.
The defendants moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which allows dismissal when a complaint does not state a legally sufficient claim. They argued that the Copyright Act preempted Count VII. In this context, preemption means that federal copyright law displaces a state-law claim because the claim seeks to enforce rights equivalent to copyright rights.
Court’s Analysis
The court applied the Copyright Act’s two-part preemption test. First, it asked whether the claim concerned material within the subject matter of copyright. Hines’s unjust enrichment claim was based on the defendants’ alleged use of portions of “Help Me,” which the court found fell within the categories of copyrightable works.
Second, the court asked whether the claim sought to enforce rights equivalent to the exclusive rights protected by copyright law, such as reproduction, adaptation, performance, distribution, or display. The court found that this requirement was clearly met because Hines based the claim on the defendants’ alleged unauthorized use of protectable elements of his song.
The court then considered whether Hines alleged an “extra element”—an additional requirement that would make the unjust enrichment claim qualitatively different from copyright infringement. The court explained that awareness, intent, or enrichment alone generally does not provide such an extra element. Hines based Count VII on the same facts as his copyright claims and alleged no additional basis beyond enrichment and awareness.
The court rejected Hines’s reliance on Ulloa v. Universal Music & Video Distribution Corp. In that case, the unjust enrichment claim could proceed because the plaintiff had identified independent theories involving unpaid labor, a possible work-for-hire arrangement, or an implied license. The court found that Hines had not alleged an implied license, a work-for-hire relationship, or another independent basis. Hines’s time and labor in creating “Help Me” did not qualify as an extra element because those facts are common to copyright claims.
The court also held that merely labeling a claim as an alternative claim does not avoid Copyright Act preemption. Because Hines had not pleaded an independent theory, the court concluded that the Copyright Act preempted Count VII.
Disposition
Judge J. Paul Oetken granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss Count VII of the Third Amended Complaint and dismissed Count VII. The clerk was directed to close the motion at Docket Number 127. The opinion does not state a disposition of Hines’s other claims in this order.
Read the full 7-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.