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S.D.N.Y.Substantive rulingFiled Sept. 20, 2022

Santos v. Commissioner of Social Security

Judge
James Cott
Docket
1:21-cv-01682
Court
U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
Pages
26
Social SecurityEvidence
In one sentence

In Santos v. Commissioner of Social Security, Judge Cott granted Santos’s motion, denied the Commissioner’s motion, and remanded for further proceedings.

Who this affects

Santos and the Social Security Administration; the case returns to the administrative law judge for further proceedings, without a benefits award in this order.

What happened

Santos asked the court to review the denial of her application for supplemental security income. The administrative law judge found that her mental-health conditions did not prevent her from working and identified jobs she could perform.

The court found that the administrative law judge did not adequately address medical opinions that Santos might miss more than three days of work each month or be off task for substantial periods. The vocational expert testified that those limitations could prevent employment, so the errors could have affected the result.

Judge Cott granted Santos’s motion, denied the Commissioner’s cross-motion, remanded the case for further proceedings, and directed entry of judgment for Santos. The court did not itself decide that Santos was disabled or order benefits.

The detailed version

For law students, journalists, and other readers who want the full reasoning

Case
Santos v. Commissioner of Social Security · No. 1:21-cv-01682
Judge
James Cott
Date
Sept. 20, 2022

Background

Ciara Crystalin Marie Santos sought judicial review of the Acting Commissioner of Social Security’s final decision denying her application for supplemental security income. The administrative law judge found that Santos had severe bipolar, depressive, anxiety, cannabis-abuse, and alcohol-abuse disorders, but concluded that she was not disabled from August 16, 2019, through July 31, 2020.

The administrative law judge determined that Santos could perform simple, routine, and repetitive work involving simple work-related decisions and no more than occasional interaction with coworkers, supervisors, and the public. Relying on vocational-expert testimony, the administrative law judge identified jobs such as hand packager, cleaner, kitchen helper, cleaner/housekeeper, and routing clerk.

Santos and the Commissioner filed competing motions for judgment on the pleadings. Santos argued, among other things, that the administrative law judge failed to account for limitations involving attendance, concentration, time off task, and absenteeism.

Court’s Analysis

The court focused on the administrative law judge’s treatment of potential absences and off-task time and found it unnecessary to decide Santos’s other arguments.

Santos’s treating psychiatrist, Dr. Joan Llesuy, stated that Santos had moderate limitations in maintaining regular attendance and punctuality and would be absent from work more than three times per month. The state-agency physicians, Dr. A. Chapman and Dr. E. Kamin, also found moderate limitations involving maintaining a schedule, regular attendance, and punctuality. The administrative law judge repeated Dr. Llesuy’s expected-absence finding but did not explain whether it was supported by or consistent with the record, or how it affected the assessment of Santos’s ability to work.

The vocational expert testified that a person with Santos’s profile could not maintain the identified jobs if absent more than once per month. The court therefore held that the administrative law judge needed to address the relationship between the medical opinions, the potential absences, and the vocational-expert testimony.

The court also found that the administrative law judge did not adequately address potential time off task. The administrative law judge found moderate limitations in concentration, persistence, or pace and in adapting or managing oneself. Dr. Llesuy’s description of a moderate limitation indicated that Santos could sustain performance for only one-third to two-thirds of an eight-hour workday. The vocational expert testified that an individual could be off task only between 5% and 10% of the workday, in addition to regular breaks. The administrative law judge did not explain how the moderate limitation fit with that testimony.

The court rejected the argument that Santos’s attendance at medical appointments necessarily showed that she could maintain regular attendance at work. It also noted evidence pointing in the opposite direction, including Santos’s testimony that she had left jobs because she felt overwhelmed and that her mental-health episodes sometimes made it difficult to get out of bed and take her daughter to school.

Disposition

The court concluded that the errors were not harmless because accepting Dr. Llesuy’s limitations could have prevented Santos from performing any of the jobs identified by the vocational expert. It directed the administrative law judge on remand to reassess Santos’s potential time off task and absences and make an explicit finding based on the entire record.

Santos’s motion was granted, the Commissioner’s cross-motion was denied, and the case was remanded under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The Clerk was directed to enter judgment for Santos. The opinion did not award benefits or determine that Santos was disabled.

The authoritative version

Read the full 26-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.

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