Davis v. Commissioner of Social Security

Background

Kelly Davis sought review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) of the Social Security Administration’s final decision denying her application for disability insurance benefits. Davis alleged that she became unable to work on May 28, 2020 because of idiopathic progressive neuropathy, systemic lupus erythematosus, obesity, fibromyalgia, urinary incontinence, and degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine. She had previously worked as a nurse for more than 30 years, including in a neonatal intensive care unit.

An administrative law judge found that Davis had severe impairments but that none met or equaled a listed impairment. The judge found that Davis had the capacity to perform light work, with a restroom break of about five minutes approximately once an hour, which could be taken during regular work breaks and lunch. The judge also found that Davis could perform her past work as a pediatric clinical nurse and had transferable skills for jobs such as outpatient receptionist and hospital admitting clerk.

The parties filed competing motions for judgment on the pleadings, asking the court to decide the case based on the pleadings and administrative record.

Davis’s Arguments About Her Past Work and the Vocational Expert

Davis argued that the vocational expert improperly relied on an older clinical-nurse position rather than her more recent registered-nurse work. The court rejected that argument. It concluded that the vocational expert’s questions referred to Davis’s registered-nurse position and that Davis had not identified a conflict between the vocational expert’s testimony and the applicable occupational description.

Davis also argued that the vocational expert’s testimony about her transferable skills was too unclear. The court disagreed because the vocational expert identified skills including data entry, entering and communicating accurate medical information, customer service, and patient care, and connected those skills to specific sedentary jobs. The court also held that the vocational expert’s answer about a possible sit-stand option was irrelevant because the administrative law judge did not include such an option in Davis’s residual functional capacity finding.

Medical-Opinion Evidence

Davis argued that the administrative law judge improperly discounted the opinion of Dr. Jerome Greenberg, a chiropractor. The court held that chiropractors are not listed as acceptable medical sources under the regulations applicable to Davis’s claim, and that the administrative law judge was not required to give the opinion deference or explain it as he would an acceptable medical source’s opinion.

Davis also argued that the administrative law judge inadequately evaluated the opinions of Dr. R. Abueg and Dr. R. Reynolds. The court concluded that the administrative law judge adequately explained why Dr. Abueg’s opinion—that Davis could not perform even sedentary work—was unsupported by the examination findings and treatment history and inconsistent with other opinions. The court also found that Dr. Reynolds’s opinion was consistent with the residual functional capacity finding, apart from the added restroom-break limitation. The administrative law judge was permitted to adopt some limitations from the medical evidence without adopting every part of an individual opinion.

Ruling

The court reviewed whether the Commissioner applied the correct legal standards and whether the decision was supported by substantial evidence, meaning relevant evidence that a reasonable person could accept as sufficient. It concluded that the administrative law judge properly evaluated Davis’s past work, the vocational expert’s testimony, and the medical opinions, and that remand was not warranted.

Judge James L. Cott denied Davis’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, granted the Commissioner’s cross-motion for judgment on the pleadings, dismissed the case, and directed the Clerk to enter judgment for the Commissioner.