Barkai v. Mendez

Background

Ariel Dan Barkai, proceeding without a lawyer, sued Clarkstown police officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He alleged that Officer George Mendez issued him a traffic ticket without wearing a mask, that Barkai complained to the police department, and that Sergeant Alice Laschet sent officers to check on him after hearing statements about a gun and suicide. Barkai alleged that officers removed him from his car, handcuffed and searched him, and took him without his consent to Good Samaritan Hospital for psychiatric evaluation. He alleged that he was released after approximately two hours.

The defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint states a legally sufficient claim. In deciding that motion, the court considered the complaint, attached documents, and recordings that the parties heavily relied upon. The court accepted Barkai’s well-pleaded factual allegations as true for purposes of the motion.

Personal involvement and omitted defendants

The court dismissed the claims against Glenn Cummings, Jeff Wannamaker, and Ray McCallugh because Barkai did not allege that they personally participated in a constitutional violation. Barkai alleged that Cummings sent him a document about pandemic officer protocols and that Wannamaker and McCallugh did not respond to his complaints, but those allegations were insufficient to establish personal involvement. The court also dismissed the claims against Thomas O’Connell, Arthur Noeldechen, Connor Golden, and Dean Domenici because Barkai named them in the caption without alleging what each person did. The court stated that, if Barkai amended his complaint, he would need to identify each person’s involvement.

Sixth Amendment claim

Barkai alleged that Mendez made a false statement about the distance between them during the traffic stop. The court explained that a claim based on fabricated evidence requires allegations that an investigating official created false information, sent it to prosecutors, and created information likely to affect the outcome of the prosecution. The court assumed for purposes of the motion that Mendez had made the alleged false statement and that it was used in Barkai’s prosecution. But the court found that Barkai did not plausibly allege that the statement concerned a material element of the traffic offense, which the parties described as using a phone while driving. The court therefore granted dismissal of the Sixth Amendment claim.

Equal protection and due process claims

The court dismissed Barkai’s equal protection claim because he did not allege intentional discrimination based on race, national origin, gender, or another legally relevant classification, and did not identify similarly situated people who were treated differently. The court also deemed the claim abandoned because Barkai did not respond meaningfully to the defendants’ argument for dismissal and referred to the claim as “nolle prosequi.”

The court dismissed Barkai’s substantive due process claims because the Fourth Amendment provided the more specific framework for analyzing the alleged seizure. The court dismissed his procedural due process claims because New York Mental Hygiene Law § 9.41 does not provide a hearing or other specific procedure before a person is transported to a hospital, and because Barkai had abandoned his Fourteenth Amendment claims.

Fourth Amendment claims

The court analyzed the detention under the Fourth Amendment, which protects against unreasonable seizures. Under New York law, probable cause generally makes a confinement legally privileged. For a mental-health seizure under New York Mental Hygiene Law § 9.41, the relevant question was whether officers had probable cause to believe that Barkai appeared mentally ill and was acting in a way likely to cause serious physical harm to himself or others.

As to Laschet, the court found probable cause based on the recorded call. Barkai spoke in an agitated manner about his mother’s death, prior suicide-related police visits, therapy for suicide prevention, being unable to take things anymore, and the possibility of putting a gun in his mouth. The court held that the call could reasonably be understood as indicating a risk of self-harm. It therefore granted dismissal of the Fourth Amendment claim against Laschet concerning the initial seizure.

The court extended that conclusion to Mendez regarding the initial seizure because an officer may rely on probable cause communicated by another officer. But the court reached a different conclusion about the continued confinement and transport to Good Samaritan Hospital. Barkai alleged that officers found no firearm and that he complied with their directions. Accepting those allegations as true, the court held that Barkai plausibly alleged that probable cause may have ended after the initial detention. The court declined to decide qualified immunity at this stage because discovery might provide additional facts. The Fourth Amendment claim against Mendez concerning the extension of the confinement therefore survived.

First Amendment retaliation claim

Barkai also alleged that the officers detained or continued to confine him in retaliation for criticizing Mendez and complaining about Mendez’s failure to wear a mask. A First Amendment retaliation claim requires protected speech, an adverse action, and a causal connection between the speech and the adverse action.

The court dismissed the claim against Laschet because probable cause defeated the retaliation claim and Barkai did not plausibly allege that Laschet acted with a retaliatory motive. The court also rejected the claim against Mendez as to the initial seizure because Barkai did not allege that Mendez knew about the earlier complaint when the initial seizure occurred.

The court allowed the claim against Mendez concerning the extension of the confinement to proceed. Barkai alleged that he continued criticizing Mendez after the officers arrived and that Mendez extended the confinement in response. The court found those allegations sufficient at the pleading stage to suggest protected criticism, a causal connection, and a concrete injury. It also rejected the argument that Barkai had to show that his speech was completely silenced, noting that emotional distress or another concrete harm may satisfy the injury requirement.

Municipal claims

The court dismissed any claims against the Town of Clarkstown under Monell v. Department of Social Services. A municipal claim under § 1983 requires a constitutional violation caused by an official policy or custom. Barkai’s amended complaint did not allege any policy, practice, or custom that caused his injuries. The court also noted that Barkai had withdrawn his claims against the Town.

Disposition

The court stated that the motion to dismiss was denied in part and granted in part. It dismissed Barkai’s Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment claims, his municipal claims, his First and Fourth Amendment claims against Laschet, and the claims against the officers for whom he alleged no personal involvement. Barkai’s First and Fourth Amendment claims against Mendez concerning the extension of his initial confinement survived.

The court stated that the dismissals were without prejudice because this was the first adjudication of the claims on the merits. Barkai could file another amended complaint within 30 days addressing the identified deficiencies. The court warned that claims dismissed after a failure to meet that deadline could be dismissed with prejudice.