Matias v. Montefiore Medical Center

Background

Lourdes Matias worked as a registered nurse in Montefiore’s Cardiac Catheterization Lab beginning in 2015. The opinion states that she was 55 and Catholic. Her job required patient care, wearing a heavy lead apron, lifting and moving objects, bending, reaching, standing for long periods, and responding quickly to changing conditions.

Matias had acute osteoarthritis that required a complete knee replacement and also had adhesive capsulitis in her left shoulder. She requested lighter-duty work because of her physical condition, but the request was denied. The opinion notes that Montefiore nevertheless sometimes assigned her to the ambulatory-care area for a day or two when possible.

The record also showed repeated lateness and other disciplinary issues. Wohlars reported that Matias was late 60 times between July 29, 2017, and July 14, 2018. Matias received verbal and written warnings, including a final written warning. The record also included complaints about unprofessional conduct, problems operating hospital equipment, yelling, and confrontational behavior. On June 28, 2018, Matias had a verbal altercation with a coworker and then sent Wohlars an email discussing, among other subjects, the Catholic Church, Christianity, abortion, same-sex marriage, and people who did not share her religious views.

Matias requested leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act, including a formal request in July 2018 for leave related to planned knee surgery. On July 10, 2018, the same day Wohlars submitted Matias’s leave paperwork, Wohlars received approval from Labor Relations to terminate Matias based on chronic lateness and the allegedly offensive and insubordinate email. Montefiore terminated Matias effective immediately by notice dated July 26, 2018.

Matias sued under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act, Title VII, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Family and Medical Leave Act, the New York State Human Rights Law, and the New York City Human Rights Law. She alleged age and disability discrimination, a religion-based hostile work environment, and interference with and retaliation for exercising FMLA rights. The defendants moved for summary judgment, which asks whether the evidence requires a trial or instead permits judgment as a matter of law.

Age-discrimination claims

The court granted summary judgment on Matias’s age-discrimination claims under the ADEA, OWBPA, New York State Human Rights Law, and New York City Human Rights Law. The court explained that the OWBPA does not create a separate private cause of action and cannot be pursued separately from an ADEA violation.

The court found that Matias had not produced evidence linking her termination to her age. She identified no age-based comments or other direct evidence of age bias. Her comparisons to coworkers did not establish age discrimination: she did not establish the age of one coworker or show that the coworker received different treatment because of age, and two other coworkers were themselves older than Matias. The court also noted that Wohlars hired and later fired Matias while Matias was already within the protected age group, which weakened the inference of age-based motive. The court concluded that Matias failed to meet both the federal and state “but-for” causation standard and the New York City law’s less demanding standard.

Disability-discrimination claims

The court granted summary judgment on Matias’s disability-discrimination claims under the ADA, New York State Human Rights Law, and New York City Human Rights Law. The court accepted that Montefiore was covered by the ADA and, for purposes of the motion, that Matias was disabled. The disputed issues were whether she could perform the essential functions of her job with or without a reasonable accommodation and whether an adverse action occurred because of her disability.

The court found that heavy work, including lifting, was an essential function of a registered nurse’s position in the Cath Lab. It relied on the written job description, which required nurses to exert up to 100 pounds of force occasionally, as well as evidence that nurses had to provide care throughout the department, assist patients, and perform emergency procedures when needed. The court rejected Matias’s comparisons to other employees because one coworker was a patient-care coordinator rather than a registered nurse, and the other nurses were also required to work in the procedure room when needed.

The court held that Matias had not identified a reasonable accommodation that would allow her to perform the essential functions of the job. Reassigning her to work that avoided heavy lifting would eliminate an essential job function, which an accommodation cannot do. The court also found that Matias offered no evidence that she was terminated because of her disability. Her New York City claim failed because she did not show that she was treated worse than other employees because of disability.

Religion-based hostile work environment claims

The court granted summary judgment on Matias’s hostile-work-environment claims under Title VII, the New York State Human Rights Law, and the New York City Human Rights Law. The court explained that federal and state law require conduct sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and that the conduct must occur because of the plaintiff’s religion. New York City law uses a more lenient standard but still requires evidence of worse treatment because of a protected characteristic.

Matias described conflicts with coworker Catherine Dries, including yelling, following her, assigning tasks, and asking whether Matias’s refusal to contribute to a same-sex wedding gift was “about the Pope.” She also said Wohlars told her not to discuss religion at work and to find another job. The court found no evidence that Dries’s conduct was motivated by hostility toward Matias’s religion. It further found that the alleged comments and directives were isolated and not sufficiently severe or pervasive. The court concluded that Matias’s allegations were workplace conflicts and unsupported speculation rather than evidence of a hostile work environment based on religion. The court also stated that the complaint did not assert a separate claim that Matias was terminated because of her religion.

FMLA interference

The court granted summary judgment on Matias’s FMLA-interference claim. To prove interference, Matias had to show that she was denied benefits to which she was entitled. The court found that the record showed Wohlars assisted with the July leave request and that Montefiore’s leave department contacted Matias to complete the paperwork.

The court stated that Matias had not shown that her May request complied with Montefiore’s leave policy or that any delay in processing it denied her an FMLA benefit. Her termination occurred before the requested leave was scheduled to begin, and the court found that the termination was based on reasons independent of the leave request. Therefore, even assuming that the May request was a valid request and was delayed, Matias had not shown actionable interference.

FMLA retaliation

The court granted summary judgment on Matias’s FMLA-retaliation claim. The court held that the close timing between Matias’s leave request and her termination was enough to establish an initial inference of retaliation. That shifted the burden to the defendants to provide a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the termination.

The court found that Montefiore had provided such reasons: Matias’s persistent lateness had reached the termination level under the employer’s progressive-discipline policy, and she had engaged in improper conduct, including the June 28 email and other workplace incidents. Matias did not provide evidence that these reasons were a pretext for retaliation. The court therefore ruled for the defendants on the retaliation claim.

Disposition

Judge Valerie Caproni granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on all of Matias’s claims. The court directed the Clerk of Court to close the motion at docket entry 33 and close the case. The opinion notes that the caption misspelled Jennette Wohlars’s surname as “Wohlar,” while the court’s text refers to her as “Wohlars.”