Goldman v. Sol Goldman Investments LLC
- Vyskocil
- 1:20-cv-06727
- U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
- 12
In Goldman v. Sol Goldman Investments, Judge Vyskocil granted partial summary judgment on disability liability and denied SGI’s cross-motion.
Jeffrey M. Goldman obtained summary judgment on liability for his NYCHRL disability-discrimination claim against Sol Goldman Investments LLC, Solil Management, LLC, and Jane H. Goldman. SGI’s cross-motion for summary judgment was denied.
What happened
In Goldman v. Sol Goldman Investments LLC, Jeffrey M. Goldman claimed that his former employers violated New York City law by refusing to accommodate his medical conditions during the COVID-19 pandemic. He asked to keep working from home after being told to return to the office.
The defendants argued that Goldman had not requested an accommodation, that he did not participate in the required discussion, that he was not fired, and that Sol Goldman Investments LLC was not his employer. The court rejected these arguments, finding that Goldman had a disability, had clearly requested to work from home, and had provided enough medical information to alert the defendants to his condition.
Judge Mary Kay Vyskocil adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation in full, granted Goldman’s motion for partial summary judgment against all defendants, and denied Sol Goldman Investments LLC’s cross-motion for summary judgment. The court also found that the defendants failed to engage in the required cooperative discussion, terminated Goldman in response to his request, and operated as a single employer.
The detailed version
- Goldman v. Sol Goldman Investments LLC · No. 1:20-cv-06727
- Vyskocil
- Sept. 27, 2022
Background
Jeffrey M. Goldman sued Sol Goldman Investments LLC (SGI), Solil Management, LLC, and Jane H. Goldman under the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the New York State Human Rights Law, and the New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL). The ruling addressed Goldman’s motion for partial summary judgment on liability for his NYCHRL disability-discrimination claim and SGI’s cross-motion for summary judgment.
Goldman began working as in-house counsel for Solil in June 2000. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the defendants first directed their legal staff to work from home and later asked employees to return in person. Goldman, who was 69 and had obesity, hypertension, and coronary artery disease, told the defendants that his health conditions increased his risk of working in an office or New York City courts. He provided a doctor’s note stating that he could continue working from home. Goldman contended that the defendants denied his request and failed to engage in the cooperative dialogue required by the NYCHRL, after which his employment ended.
The defendants argued that Goldman did not request an accommodation, that he refused to participate in a cooperative dialogue, that working from home would have caused an undue hardship, that he was not fired, and that SGI was not his employer.
Court’s Review of the Recommendation
Magistrate Judge Sarah Netburn recommended granting Goldman’s motion for partial summary judgment against all defendants and denying SGI’s cross-motion. The defendants objected. After reviewing the objections, the court adopted the Report and Recommendation in full.
Disability and Notice
The court held that there was no genuine dispute that Goldman had a disability under the NYCHRL. That law broadly defines disability to include any physical, medical, mental, or psychological impairment. The defendants did not offer evidence disputing Goldman’s obesity, hypertension, or coronary artery disease, and they did not provide authority showing that those conditions did not qualify.
The court also held that the defendants had notice of Goldman’s disability. His email referred to underlying health issues and his doctor’s advice that he could not return to the office or court but could continue working from home. After receiving the email, SGI’s general counsel requested a doctor’s note, and Goldman provided one. The court found that the email and note sufficiently informed the defendants of his medical impairment.
The court rejected the argument that Goldman’s communication was not an accommodation request because it was not phrased as a formal request or did not identify each medical condition. A request for an accommodation need not use a particular form, mention the statute, or use the phrase “reasonable accommodation.” The court found that Goldman’s communication clearly asked to continue working from home.
Failure to Engage in a Cooperative Dialogue
The NYCHRL requires an employer to engage within a reasonable time in a good-faith discussion with a person who requests an accommodation or whom the employer knows may need one. That discussion concerns the person’s needs, possible accommodations and alternatives, and the difficulties those accommodations may cause the employer.
The court found no genuine dispute that the defendants failed to engage in that dialogue. The general counsel responded to Goldman’s email by writing, “You are our court attorney!!!! Help!” Jane H. Goldman did not ask for more information or discuss alternative accommodations during a later call, and she testified that working from home was not an accommodation and that she did not engage in an interactive process with Goldman.
The court rejected the defendants’ argument that Goldman had failed to participate in good faith. When asked for a doctor’s note, Goldman provided one. The other communications identified by the defendants did not request medical or other information. The court also found that the defendants’ general COVID-19 safety measures did not address the specific accommodation discussion required by the NYCHRL.
Termination
The defendants argued that a factual dispute existed over whether Goldman had been fired or had voluntarily retired or resigned. The court found that Jane H. Goldman’s testimony that Goldman had retired or resigned was insufficient to defeat summary judgment, particularly because her later testimony showed that she had interpreted his unwillingness to return to the office as an intention to retire or quit.
The defendants also did not dispute that, immediately after the call between Goldman and Jane H. Goldman, they shut off his work email and computer access and terminated his health-insurance benefits. The court held that there was no genuine dispute that the defendants terminated Goldman in response to his request to work from home.
SGI and Solil as a Single Employer
The court applied the single-employer doctrine, which can treat nominally separate entities as one integrated employer for certain employment-law violations. The court found that SGI and Solil operated as a single employer based on uncontested evidence of common management, shared office space, interrelated operations, family connections, and common ownership. Jane H. Goldman was a decisionmaker for both entities, the same general counsel served both, both supervised Goldman, and Goldman performed legal work for SGI while employed by Solil.
The court therefore found that SGI could be held jointly liable with Solil, even though Solil was Goldman’s employer. The court found that the defendants had not shown a genuine factual dispute on this issue.
Disposition
The defendants’ objections were overruled, and the Report and Recommendation was adopted in its entirety. Goldman’s motion for partial summary judgment was granted against all Defendants. SGI’s cross-motion for summary judgment was denied. The clerk was directed to terminate docket entries 95 and 104.
Read the full 12-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.