Mercer v. New York City Housing Authority

Background

Robert Mercer, proceeding without a lawyer, filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and also appeared to assert state-law claims against the New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA). He sought damages and a declaration from the court. Mercer alleged that lead paint was found in his NYCHA apartment on March 17, 2022; that a July 6, 2022 blood test showed lead in his bloodstream; and that lead exposure caused or would continue to cause harmful effects to his mental and physical health. He also alleged that mold spores and lead dust worsened his asthma.

The opinion describes an earlier related proceeding in which Mercer asserted federal and state-law claims arising from the lead paint. The court dismissed the federal claims for failure to state a claim, declined to consider the state-law claims, and allowed Mercer time to amend to assert a claim under the Fair Housing Act. The court later dismissed that earlier proceeding without prejudice after construing Mercer’s filing as a request for voluntary dismissal.

Federal Claims

Because Mercer had been allowed to proceed without paying filing fees, the court screened his complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). That law requires dismissal of an action that is frivolous, fails to state a claim, or seeks money from an immune defendant. The court also applied the requirement that a complaint contain enough factual detail to make a claim plausible.

The court dismissed Mercer’s § 1983 claims. For a § 1983 claim against a local government entity such as NYCHA, a plaintiff must allege that the entity’s own policy, custom, or practice caused a constitutional violation. The court held, however, that there is no constitutional right to safe and sanitary housing. It therefore dismissed Mercer’s claims for failure to state a claim without needing to decide whether NYCHA had a qualifying policy, custom, or practice.

State-Law Claims and Amendment

After dismissing the federal claims, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction—the court’s discretionary authority to hear related state-law claims—over any state-law claims Mercer was asserting. The court also denied leave to amend because it concluded that the defects in the complaint could not be cured by amendment.

Disposition

The court dismissed the action. It dismissed Mercer’s federal-law claims for failure to state a claim, declined to consider his state-law claims under supplemental jurisdiction, denied leave to amend, certified that any appeal would not be taken in good faith, and denied fee-free status for purposes of an appeal. The court directed that judgment issue.