King v. Habib Bank Limited
- Lorna Schofield
- 1:20-cv-04322
- U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
- 24
In King v. Habib Bank Limited, Judge Schofield dismissed primary-liability claims but allowed secondary-liability claims under terrorism law to proceed.
The ruling affected the 370 plaintiffs and Habib Bank Limited. The plaintiffs’ primary-liability claims were dismissed, while their secondary-liability claims were allowed to continue; the bank’s personal-jurisdiction challenge was denied without prejudice to renewal.
What happened
In King v. Habib Bank Limited, 370 people injured in terrorist attacks in Afghanistan, or family members of people injured or killed there, sued Habib Bank Limited under federal terrorism law. The bank asked the court to dismiss the complaints.
The court ruled that the complaints adequately alleged personal jurisdiction in New York because the claims were connected to the bank’s use of its New York branch and banking system. It dismissed the plaintiffs’ primary-liability claims, finding that the alleged banking services were not themselves acts of international terrorism. The court denied the jurisdiction challenge without prejudice to renewal after jurisdictional discovery.
The court allowed the plaintiffs’ secondary-liability claims to continue, finding that the complaints plausibly alleged that the bank aided and abetted, and conspired with, terrorist organizations involved in the attacks. Judge Lorna G. Schofield therefore granted the motion to dismiss in part and denied it in part.
The detailed version
- King v. Habib Bank Limited · No. 1:20-cv-04322
- Lorna Schofield
- Sept. 28, 2022
Background
The three cases were consolidated and involved 370 plaintiffs. The complaints alleged that the plaintiffs were injured, or that their family members were injured or killed, in terrorist attacks in Afghanistan between 2010 and 2019. The plaintiffs sued Habib Bank Limited under the Anti-Terrorism Act, as amended by the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act, seeking damages based on the bank’s alleged financial services to al-Qaeda and related terrorist organizations, fronts, and fundraisers.
The complaints alleged that the bank operated a New York branch during the relevant period and used New York’s banking system to process transactions. They also alleged that the bank maintained relationships with entities and individuals linked to terrorism, failed to follow anti-money-laundering requirements, used a customer “whitelist,” and engaged in “wire-stripping” that concealed transaction information. The bank moved to dismiss the complaints.
Personal Jurisdiction
The court held that the complaints adequately alleged personal jurisdiction over the bank. Personal jurisdiction is a court’s power to hear a case against a particular defendant. The court found that the allegations plausibly connected the plaintiffs’ claims to the bank’s purposeful use of New York’s banking system, including its New York branch, to process transactions allegedly connected to terrorism.
The court rejected the bank’s factual arguments at the motion-to-dismiss stage. At that stage, the court generally accepts well-pleaded allegations as true and does not resolve factual disputes. The court stated that the bank could renew its jurisdictional challenge after jurisdictional discovery. The motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction was therefore denied without prejudice to renewal.
Primary Liability
The court granted the motion to dismiss the primary-liability claims. The Anti-Terrorism Act’s primary-liability provision provides a civil remedy for injuries caused by an act of international terrorism. The court explained that this provision generally applies to the people or entities that directly perpetrate the terrorist acts.
The plaintiffs alleged that the bank provided money and banking services to terrorist organizations and their affiliates. But they did not argue that the banking services themselves were violent acts, and the complaints did not allege a sufficiently direct connection between the bank’s services and a particular violent act or act dangerous to human life. The court therefore concluded that the alleged banking services were not themselves acts of international terrorism for purposes of primary liability. The primary-liability claims were dismissed.
Secondary Liability Under JASTA
The court denied the motion to dismiss the secondary-liability claims. JASTA allows a claim for an injury arising from an act of international terrorism committed, planned, or authorized by a designated foreign terrorist organization when a defendant aids and abets the act by knowingly providing substantial assistance or conspires with the person who committed it.
The court held that the complaints sufficiently alleged that the attacks were committed, planned, or authorized by al-Qaeda or another designated foreign terrorist organization. The allegations included operational coordination between al-Qaeda and non-designated groups, including the Taliban and the Haqqani Network before the Haqqani Network’s designation. The court concluded that the complaints plausibly alleged that al-Qaeda planned or authorized attacks even when other groups carried them out.
Aiding and Abetting
Applying the three-part test from Halberstam v. Welch, the court found that the complaints adequately alleged aiding and abetting. That test requires allegations that: (1) the assisted party committed a wrongful act causing injury; (2) the defendant was generally aware of its role in an overall illegal or tortious activity when it provided assistance; and (3) the defendant knowingly and substantially assisted the wrongful act.
The court found the general-awareness requirement adequately pleaded. The complaints alleged that the bank provided extensive services to entities whose connections to al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups were allegedly well known, including Al Rajhi Bank, Al-Rehmat Trust, and other terrorist-affiliated individuals and organizations. The court stated that the plaintiffs did not need to plead that the bank knew the details of each particular attack.
The court also found knowing and substantial assistance adequately pleaded. The complaints alleged that the bank helped terrorist fronts and funders evade sanctions and obtain access to millions of dollars. In considering whether the assistance was substantial, the court applied factors concerning the nature and amount of assistance, the defendant’s relationship with the principal, the defendant’s state of mind, and the duration of the assistance. The court found that five of the six factors supported the claim; the bank’s absence from the attacks was the only factor that did not.
Conspiracy
The court also denied the motion to dismiss the conspiracy claims. It found that the complaints plausibly alleged that the bank agreed to help customers evade sanctions and furthered a common campaign of terrorism. The court stated that a conspiracy need not be proven through an explicit agreement and that, at the pleading stage, the alleged conduct supported an inference that the bank shared the unlawful objective.
The court rejected the bank’s argument that it could be liable only if it directly conspired with the people who physically committed each attack. The court concluded that the complaints plausibly alleged that the bank joined a conspiracy that included groups involved in committing the attacks.
Disposition
The court granted in part and denied in part the motion to dismiss. It denied the motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction without prejudice to renewal, granted the motion with respect to the primary-liability claims, and denied it with respect to the secondary-liability claims. The parties were directed to meet and file a proposed case-management plan and scheduling order by October 19, 2022.
Read the full 24-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.