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S.D.N.Y.Procedural orderFiled Sept. 29, 2022

Askins v. Weinberg

Judge
Carter
Docket
1:19-cv-08793
Court
U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
Pages
16
ADA / DisabilityMotion to DismissCivil ProcedurePro Se
In one sentence

In Askins v. Weinberg, Judge Carter granted defendants’ motion to dismiss disability claims, allowing amendment without prejudice.

Who this affects

Delroy Askins’s disability-discrimination claims against STRIVE International, Inc. and the individual defendants were dismissed without prejudice, subject to his opportunity to amend within 30 days.

What happened

In Askins v. Weinberg, Delroy Askins, who uses a wheelchair, alleged that STRIVE International and several individuals treated him unfairly and failed to accommodate him during a job-training application process. He brought claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act.

The court ruled that Askins had not shown an employer-employee relationship or completed the required administrative steps for his employment-discrimination claim. It also ruled that STRIVE was not a public entity for the ADA’s government-services provision, that his disability-accommodation claim lacked an alleged request for an accommodation, and that his Rehabilitation Act claim did not allege discrimination solely because of his disability. The court found that some allegations could support an ADA disparate-impact claim, but Askins requested only money damages, which are unavailable under the ADA provision involved.

Judge Andrew L. Carter, Jr. granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The dismissal was without prejudice, and Askins was allowed 30 days to file an amended complaint; failing to do so would result in dismissal with prejudice.

The detailed version

For law students, journalists, and other readers who want the full reasoning

Case
Askins v. Weinberg · No. 1:19-cv-08793
Judge
Carter
Date
Sept. 29, 2022

Background

Delroy Askins, proceeding without a lawyer, sued Philip Weinberg, Erica Joshua, Ms. Smith, Mr. Jackson, Ms. Diaz, and STRIVE International, Inc. He alleged disability discrimination under Titles I, II, and III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.

Askins alleged that he is paraplegic and uses a wheelchair. He attended an information session and applied for a job-training program at STRIVE. According to the amended complaint, furniture made it difficult to reach the reception desk, employees did not assist him, an employee interrupted and urged him to finish an examination, and staff separated him from other interviewees during a panel interview. He also alleged that interviewers treated him differently from other applicants and that STRIVE rejected him because panelists believed he was seeking a job rather than training.

Before filing this federal case, Askins filed an administrative complaint against STRIVE with the New York State Division of Human Rights. That agency dismissed the complaint for lack of probable cause, and Askins did not appeal. Defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which permits dismissal when a complaint does not state a legally sufficient claim.

Collateral Estoppel

The court rejected defendants’ argument that the state administrative decision barred Askins’s federal claims. It explained that, in this setting, a state agency decision is not given preclusive effect when it has not been reviewed by a state court.

ADA Title I

Title I addresses disability discrimination in employment. The court held that Askins did not exhaust the required administrative remedies because he conceded that he had not received a right-to-sue letter from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. The court also held that he had not alleged an employer-employee relationship with STRIVE and had not alleged that he received compensation or benefits from STRIVE.

The court nevertheless concluded that, assuming Askins could otherwise pursue a Title I claim, his allegation that he was rejected from the training program was sufficient at the pleading stage to allege an adverse action. The court dismissed the Title I claim because Askins had not exhausted administrative remedies and had not alleged an employment relationship.

ADA Title II

Title II applies to discrimination by a public entity, such as a state or local government or its instrumentality. Askins argued that STRIVE was a government instrumentality because it was a nonprofit organization providing job training that government entities would otherwise provide and received government grants.

The court held that receiving government funding and providing services that government entities also provide did not make STRIVE a public entity. It therefore dismissed the Title II claim.

ADA Title III

Title III prohibits discrimination in places of public accommodation. The court noted that Askins sought only monetary damages, while private individuals may obtain only injunctive relief under Title III. Because he did not request specific injunctive relief, the court dismissed the Title III claims on that ground but continued analyzing the allegations because it allowed him to amend his complaint.

The court rejected Askins’s failure-to-accommodate theory because he did not identify specific accommodations that he requested and that defendants denied. The court also found that his disparate-impact theory—based on allegedly neutral practices that adversely affected people with disabilities—barely survived the pleading stage. However, because Askins had not requested a legally available form of relief, the court dismissed his ADA claims in their entirety.

Rehabilitation Act

Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act protects qualified people with disabilities from discrimination under programs or activities receiving federal financial assistance. The court found that Askins had alleged enough to proceed past the pleading stage on whether STRIVE received federal financial assistance, based on his allegations about federal programs and government grants.

The court nevertheless denied the Rehabilitation Act claim because Section 504 requires the alleged exclusion or discrimination to occur solely because of the person’s disability. Askins alleged that STRIVE said it rejected him because panelists believed he was seeking a job rather than a training program, so the complaint did not allege that disability was the sole reason.

Individual Defendants

The court dismissed the claims against the individual defendants. It held that individuals cannot be held personally liable under ADA Titles I and II or under the Rehabilitation Act. For Title III, Askins had not alleged facts showing that the individual defendants controlled STRIVE’s accommodation policies or had responsibility for making required accommodations.

Disposition

Judge Andrew L. Carter, Jr. granted defendants’ motion to dismiss. The dismissal was without prejudice. The court gave Askins 30 days to file an amended complaint addressing the identified deficiencies and requiring him to include all claims and factual allegations. The court stated that failure to file within 30 days would result in dismissal with prejudice. The clerk was directed to terminate the motions at ECF No. 59 and mail the order to Askins.

The authoritative version

Read the full 16-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.

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